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GROUP HEALTH BENEFITS DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST AIDS VICTIMS: FALLING THROUGH THE
GAPS OF FEDERAL LAW-ERISA, THE
REHABILITATION ACT AND THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) is a devastating dis-
ease, which has already taken more lives in America than the entire Viet-
nam war.1 While AIDS victims fight a physically and emotionally
debilitating, incurable illness,2 they may also have to wage another bat-
tle-to obtain or maintain adequate health insurance coverage. Until re-
cently, most of the conflict has centered upon access to individual health
insurance coverage.3 Now, however, skirmishes over coverage for AIDS
under group health insurance plans are occurring between AIDS victims
and their employers.4
To date, there have been several incidents of employers limiting
AIDS coverage in their group health insurance plans.5 Such practices
1. Compare S. KARNow, VIETNAM: A HISTORY 9 (1983) (nearly 58,000 killed and miss-
ing in action in the Vietnam war) with CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SUR-
VEILLANCE REP. 13 (Nov. 1990) (94,375 adult AIDS deaths reported through October 1990).
2. See Hawkins, Psychological and Social Concerns of Clients with AIDS and Related
Conditions, in AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL 1-2 to 1-3 (2d ed. 1988).
3. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
4. Group health insurance operates by spreading the risk of health care expenses among a
group of people, usually among employees of either a single employer or a group of employers.
R. FOSTER, THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 30 (1986). Healthy individu-
als within the group help pay for the health care expenses of those who are ill. Id. In theory,
this approach applies regardless of the method by which the benefits are funded. See id.
5. The first publicly reported case of an employer limiting medical coverage for AIDS
occurred in late 1987, when Circle K Corporation informed 8,000 employees that its self-
funded medical plan would no longer cover health care claims resulting from "personal lifes-
tyle decisions" for employees hired after January 1, 1988. Huntley, Firm Suspends Policy Ex-
cluding AIDS Claims, Bus. INS., Aug. 15, 1988, at 2, 2. The policy would have excluded
AIDS claims by homosexuals and drug users, but not AIDS claims resulting from blood trans-
fusions. Id. Circle K defended the policy as a permissible design to control health care costs
based on preemption by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988), even though the policy did not exclude coverage for all medical
claims related to lifestyle choices, such as drug and alcohol rehabilitation. Huntley, supra, at
2. See infra notes 86-158 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ERISA preemption
doctrine. Because of public and employee pressure, Circle K dropped the "personal lifestyle"
policy in September 1988. Circle K Drops "Lifestyle" Policy, Bus. INS., Sept. 26, 1988, at 2, 2.
No Circle K employees had been denied coverage under the policy before its elimination. Id.
For an analysis of the use of employer practices aimed at unhealthy or risk-taking employees
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are likely to increase as employers continue to suffer from rapidly escalat-
ing health insurance costs and the growing AIDS epidemic.
Most states prohibit AIDS discrimination in employee benefit plans
through either employment discrimination laws6  or insurance
who are likely to increase group benefits costs, and the possible remedies under section 510 of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, see Vogel, Containing Medical and Disability Costs by Cutting Un-
healthy Employees: Does Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1024 (1987).
Another example of an AIDS exclusion involved a company in Oregon that excluded
AIDS treatment from coverage under its group health insurance plan. Israel & Scott, AIDS-
related Insurance Ceilings Are Risky, HR MAO., Nov. 1990, at 85, 86. The Oregon Bureau of
Labor held that the AIDS exclusion violated a state anti-discrimination law because it had a
disparate impact on men. Id.
In late 1988, Lincoln Foodservice Products of Fort Wayne, Indiana imposed a lifetime
maximum benefit of $50,000 and an annual maximum of $25,000 for AIDS coverage under its
self-funded group health plan. Locke, Firm to Appeal Ban on Limits for AIDS Cover, Bus.
INS., Dec. 24, 1990, at 1, 1. The lifetime maximum benefit for most other illnesses was $1
million. Id. The practice was held to violate Indiana state civil rights law by a state civil
rights commission hearing officer. Id. Lincoln Foodservice Products has appealed the ruling,
arguing that the AIDS cap was implemented to hold down health care costs, and that the state
law is preempted by ERISA. Id. at 4. See infra notes 86-158 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the ERISA preemption doctrine.
Another employer, Galaxy Carpet Mill of Chatsworth, Georgia, imposed a $10,000 life-
time maximum on health care benefits for "voluntarily contracted" AIDS and other sexually
transmitted diseases under its self-funded health care plan. Bradford, Cap on AIDS Claims
Dropped: Firm Revises Benefit Policy, Bus. INS., Feb. 19, 1990, at 2, 2. The policy was
dropped in early 1990 after strong protests from AIDS activists. Id.
The first federal case involving the issue of whether an employer violates ERISA by limit-
ing AIDS coverage in a self-funded group health plan was McGann v. H & H Music Co., 742
F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990), appealfiled, No. 90-2672 (5th Cir. July 27, 1990). For a discus-
sion of McGann, see infra note 56 and accompanying text. It is likely that the terminal nature
of AIDS, coupled with the drain on personal finances that results from a lack of health insur-
ance coverage, have contributed to the dearth of lawsuits fighting AIDS group health insur-
ance limitations.
In Owens v. Storehouse Inc., a furniture company modified its self-funded health plan to
limit payment for AIDS to $25,000, from a previous cap of $1 million, after several employees
incurred AIDS-related expenses. 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1985 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 16, 1990). The
court refused to grant a temporary restraining order directing the company to continue paying
Owens' medical bills, noting that the company had a legitimate business reason to modify the
plan. Id. at 1986. Storehouse spent more than $250,000 on caring for Owens. Id.
There are probably other unreported examples of employers limiting group health plan
coverage for AIDS. In 1990, the first nationwide study of discrimination related to HIV infec-
tion was conducted. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, EPIDEMIC OF FEAR (1990)
[hereinafter ACLU]. The study found that insurance issues accounted for 13% of the com-
plaints of HIV discrimination. Id. at 24.
6. All states, and the District of Columbia, prohibit employment discrimination on the
basis of handicap or disability. See ALA. CODE § 21-7-8 (1990) (government and public sup-
ported employment only); ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-
1461, -1463 (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-14-301 (1987) (government and public supported
employment only); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12940, 19231, 19702 (West 1980); CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1735 (West 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-401, -402 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-
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51, -60, -70 (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 722-726 (Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-
2502, -2512, 6-1705 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.042, 413.08(3), 760.02, 760.10 (West
1986 & Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6A-2 to -4, 45-19-29 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (ex-
cludes communicable diseases, and perhaps HIV infection, from coverage); HAw. REV. STAT.
§§ 378-1 to -3 (1985 & Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 56-707 (1976) (employment supported by
public funds only); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, paras. 1-103, 2-101 to -104 (1990); IND. CODE
§§ 22-9-1-2, -3, -13 (1988) (government and private employment); id. § 16-7-5-6 (public em-
ployment); IOWA CODE §§ 601A.6, 601D.2 (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1002, -1009
(1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.130-.160 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1990)
(prohibiting HIV employment discrimination); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2253, :2254(A)-
(E) (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4553, 4571-73 (1989); MD. ANN. CODE art.
49B, §§ 14-16 (1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, §§ 1, 4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990);
MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 37.1102,.1103, .1201-.1209 (1985); MINN. STAT. §§ 256C.01, 363.01-
.03 (1990); MISs. CODE ANN. §§ 25-9-103, -149, 43-6-15 (1981 & Supp. 1990) (government or
employment supported by public funds only); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 191.665, 213.010, .055
(1986 & Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-101, -2-303, -4-101 (1989); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 20-131, 20-167 to -169, 48-1115 (1988) (prohibiting disability and HIV employment
discrimination); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 281.370, 613.310-.330, 613.350 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 354-A:8 (1984 & Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-5, -12 (West 1976 & Supp.
1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2, -7 (1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292, 296 (McKinney 1982
& Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 168A-3 to -5 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01 to
.4-06 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-.02 (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. tit.
25, §§ 1301-1308 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.400, .425 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§§ 954-955 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-6, -7 (1986 & Supp. 1990);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-33-510 to -580 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (only if not subject to federal dis-
crimination statutes); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 20-13-1, -10 to -13 (1987); TEx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 5.01-.10 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 34-35-2, -6 (1988 & Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495, 495d (1987 & Supp.
1990); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.5-3,41 (1988) (not applicable if employer covered by the federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.60.040, .172, .180 (1990) (handicap and
HIV infection); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-3, -9 (1990); WIs. STAT. §§ 111.321-.322, .34 (1987);
Wyo. STAT. § 27-9-105 (1987).
A recent survey indicates that most states would interpret their prohibitions on handicap
or disability discrimination in employment to cover AIDS. NATIONAL GAY RIGHTS ADVO-
CATES, PROTECTION AGAINST AIDS-RELATED DISCRIMINATION UNDER STATE HANDICAP
LAWS: A FIFTY STATE ANALYSIS 7-9 (1989). A number of states either exclude AIDS or
have not explicitly decided whether AIDS is included within the scope of their employment
discrimination laws: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, New Hampshire, North Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Virginia, Wyoming. Id.
Several cities also prohibit AIDS discrimination in employment. See, eg., Los ANGELES,
CAL., MUN. CODE art. 5.8, §§ 45.80-.82 (1989); WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., MUN. CODE art.
IV, §§ 42704272 (1988).
Employment discrimination laws usually protect employees from employment discrimina-
tion based on handicap, race, color, religion, sex, age or national origin. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1463(B) (1985) ("It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer...
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, age,
handicap or national origin."). Some states limit the application of such laws to employers
with a minimum number of employees. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(h) (1988) (limiting
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laws.' Employers can avoid these state mandates by taking advantage of
application of private employment discrimination law to employers with six or more employ-
ees).
For a comprehensive survey of state handicap discrimination laws governing employ-
ment, real estate, public accommodations and other areas, see ACLU, supra note 5, at 83-133.
7. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(l)(f)(IV), (VIII), (IX) (1987 & Supp. 1990)
(prohibiting insurance classification based on physical disability, except if based on expected
risk of loss different from other individuals; prohibiting use of sexual orientation in underwrit-
ing; prohibiting adverse underwriting decisions related to seeking AIDS counseling); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 38a-816(12) (1991) (prohibiting refusal or limitation of insurance based on phys-
ical disability, except where based on sound actuarial principles or related to actual or reason-
ably anticipated experience); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-221 to -230 (1981 & Supp. 1990)
(prohibiting insurance discrimination based on HIV infection or AIDS); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 627.429 (West Supp. 1991) (prohibiting HIV/AIDS coverage limitations in group health
insurance policies; limiting use of HIV testing for health insurance eligibility; permitting HIV/
AIDS exclusions in first policy year if insurer unable to test); id. § 627.644 (West 1984)
(prohibiting insurance discrimination based on handicap, unless handicap predates applica-
tion); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:13-103(a)(7)(G)-(H) (Supp. 1990) (prohibiting refusal to insure
or coverage limitations based solely on person taking HIV test before applying for insurance,
or without consent of applicant); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-013(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Mer-
rill Supp. 1990) (prohibiting coverage exclusions based on HIV infection in different manner
than those that apply to any other health condition; prohibiting cancellation because of HIV
infection; prohibiting use of sexual orientation in underwriting); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
24A, § 2846 (1990) (prohibiting HIV coverage limitations in group health insurance policies
more restrictive than for any other sickness or disabling condition); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 175, § 193T (West 1987) (prohibiting insurance discrimination based on handicap, except
where based on sound actuarial practice or actual experience); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 191.650,
.671 (Supp. 1990) (prohibiting HIV testing and coverage exclusions upon renewal of group
health insurance policies); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-10 (1987) (prohibiting health insurance
discrimination based on handicap, except when based on sound actuarial or underwriting prin-
ciples); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3901.45(E) (Anderson 1989) (prohibiting HIV coverage lim-
itations in insurance policies); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-6-22 to -24 (1989 & Supp. 1991)
(prohibiting HIV testing and refusal to insure in group insurance plans of more than twenty-
five persons); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-5A (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1991) (prohibiting
public entities from providing group health insurance that limits or excludes HIV coverage);
id. art. 3.51-6, § 3C (prohibiting HIV coverage limitations in group insurance plans); WASH.
REv. CODE § 49.60.178 (1990) (prohibiting cancellation or nonrenewal of insurance based on
handicap); W. VA. CODE § 33-16-9 (1988) (prohibiting cancellation or nonrenewal of group
health insurance because of HIV infection); Wis. STAT. § 631.93 (Supp. 1990) (prohibiting
HIV infection exclusions or limitations in health insurance policies, unless applied generally to
other illnesses or medical conditions).
While most states do not statutorily prohibit AIDS discrimination in health insurance
coverage and eligibility, all states regulate the underwriting practices of insurance companies
doing business in that state. ACLU, supra note 5, at 75-76. One commentator has noted:
According to [National Gay Rights Advocates], at least 18 state insurance depart-
ments (Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee and Wisconsin) have indicated that they will
not allow insurance companies to exclude or severely limit health insurance coverage
for AIDS.
Scherzer, Insurance and AIDS-Related Issues, in AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 2, at
VIII-5 [hereinafter Scherzer, AIDS-Related Issues]. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, how-
ever, has struck down insurance regulations that would have prohibited HIV testing for under-
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the preemptive effect of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA).8 Employee benefits discrimination against AIDS vic-
tims is possible because ERISA generally preempts all state laws relating
to employer-sponsored group health plans.9
If employers self-fund 0 their group health plans, they generally can
avoid, through ERISA preemption, all state insurance and employment
discrimination laws relating to such plans. 1 ERISA also preempts state
employment discrimination laws relating to insured employee benefit
plans, as long as the laws do not regulate insurance.
1 2
This Comment discusses the ERISA preemption doctrine and how
some employers legally discriminate against employees with AIDS by
limiting coverage for AIDS under group health plans, while continuing
to provide full coverage for other catastrophic or chronic illnesses. 3 The
primary focus of this Comment is on the preemptive effect of ERISA
with respect to self-funded group health plans.
This Comment's analysis is in two parts. The analysis begins with
an examination of various sections of ERISA to discover possible sources
writing of group health plans. Life Ins. Ass'n v. Commissioner of Ins., 403 Mass. 410, 419,
530 N.E.2d 168, 173 (1988). Regulations and statutes aimed at insurance companies doing
business in a particular state, and the insured group health plans they market to employers, do
not apply to self-funded group health plans. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 409
(1990); ACLU, supra note 5, at 76. Thus, employers can avoid these insurance requirements
by changing their group health plans from an insured to a self-funded arrangement. See infra
note 10 and accompanying text for a discussion of self-funding group health plans.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988). Some employee benefit plans are excluded from ER-
ISA coverage-for example, governmental employer plans and church plans. See id.
§ 1003(b). Because these plans are not subject to ERISA preemption, state and local protec-
tions for AIDS victims would generally be available. See id. See infra notes 86-158 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of the ERISA preemption doctrine.
9. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1987).
10. Self-funding or self-insuring generally refers to an employer assuming total financial
responsibility and risk for providing plan benefits, as opposed to an insurance company assum-
ing all or part of the financial responsibility and risk. Harker, Noninsured.Approaches to Fund-
ing Welfare Benefits, in THE HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 707, 707 (J. Rosenbloom
ed. 1984). For purposes of this Comment, the terms self-funded and self-insured are synony-
mous. Many employers that self-fund their health care benefits purchase stop-loss insurance,
where the employer self-insures its plan expenses up to a certain dollar level for each claim, or
up to a specific level of aggregate expenses during the year, but then insures the balance of
liabilities over this amount with an independent insurer. Fletcher, Types of Health Risk Bear-
ers, in THE HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra, at 131, 137. See infra note 47 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the growing trend to self-fund group health plans.
11. FMC, 111 S. Ct. at 409.
12. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 44-45.
13. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the discriminatory
implications of limiting coverage for AIDS while continuing to provide unreduced coverage
for other catastrophic and chronic illnesses.
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of relief for employees with AIDS facing group health plan restrictions. 14
This Comment then analyzes the application of two federal statutes' s
that prohibit employment discrimination to AIDS discrimination in
group health plans: the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,16 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990.17
The Comment concludes that current federal law does not ade-
quately protect an employee with AIDS when his or her employer limits
or denies group health plan coverage for AIDS. The author recommends
a legislative solution to prohibit certain forms of AIDS discrimination in
employee benefit plans. The recommendation attempts to balance the
competing interests of persons with AIDS, employers and society.
II. BACKGROUND
A. AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection
AIDS is the final stage in a continuum of infection caused by the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).18 The first stage of the illness is
asymptomatic HIV infection.19 During this stage, the infected person
has no visible signs of illness.20 In the second stage, symptomatic HIV
infection, the HIV-infected person develops symptoms.21 It is during
this second stage that most infected persons initially seek medical care.22
14. These sections include vesting, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
§ 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053; reporting and disclosure, id. §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031;
interference with protected rights, id. § 510,29 U.S.C. § 1140; and fiduciary duties, Id. §§ 401-
414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114.
15. Other federal statutes might have application to this area, but are beyond the scope of
this Comment. For example, AIDS restrictions in employee benefit plans may violate title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988), where such restrictions
have a disparate impact on men. See supra note 5 for a discussion of an Oregon civil rights
case, in which an employee benefit plan AIDS restriction was held to violate a state discrimina-
tion law because it had a disparate impact on men.
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988).
17. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 327 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
18. Rennert, Parry & Horowitz, AIDS and Persons with Developmental Disabilities: The
Legal Perspective, 1989 A.B.A. COMM'N ON MENTALLY DISABLED & CENTER ON CHILDREN
& L. 8 [hereinafter AIDS Disabilities]; see Curran, Jaffe, Hardy, Morgan, Selik & Dondero,
Epidemiology of HIV Infection and AIDS in the United States, 239 Sci. 610, 615 (1988). HIV
is transmitted through sexual contact and blood or blood products, as well as from mother to
unborn infant. Id. at 614.
19. AIDS Disabilities, supra note 18, at 8.
20. Id. HIV infection can, however, be detected by a simple blood test. Id. at 9-10.
21. Id. at 8. Symptoms include "swollen lymph nodes[], weight loss, fever, diarrhea,
thrush, general malaise, skin tumors, and other conditions." Id.
22. Cf. id. (until symptomatic HIV infection, individuals remain healthy and do not have
visible symptoms of illness).
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The final stage of HIV infection is Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome (AIDS).2 3 The United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
defines AIDS as HIV infection in conjunction with certain symptoms or
diseases.24 While there are some rare exceptions, virtually all AIDS vic-
tims die within five years after being diagnosed with AIDS.2"
The AIDS epidemic is growing rapidly in the United States. From
December 1988 to October 1990, the total number of AIDS cases in the
United States reported to the CDC grew from 82,76426 to 154,917.27
More than half of these cases have already resulted in fatalities.28 In late
1990, the CDC estimated that approximately one million Americans
were infected with HIV.29 By some estimates, over half of HIV-posi-
tive30 people will develop AIDS within two to ten years of becoming
infected.31 Therefore, even if HIV infection were to stop today, a large
number of people would still develop AIDS during the next decade. At
the end of 1989, the CDC projected that between 175,000 and 254,000
new cases of AIDS would be reported in the United States during 1991,
1992 and 1993.32
23. Id. at 8.
24. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Up-
date: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 1981-1988, in REPORTS ON
HIV/AIDS: JANUARY-DECEMBER 1989 15, 15 (1990). Some illnesses are considered by the
CDC to be presumptive evidence of AIDS, including Kaposi's sarcoma, Pneumocystis carinii
pneumonia and esophageal candidiasis. Id.; AIDS Disabilities, supra note 18, at 8. For the
purposes of discussion in this Comment related to employer-sponsored group health plans,
HIV infection and AIDS will be treated synonymously.
25. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: 1988 Update, in
REPORTS ON HIV/AIDS: JANUARY-DECEMBER 1989, supra note 24, at 41, 43 [hereinafter
1988 AIDS Update].
26. Id. at 42.
27. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 1, at 8.
28. Id. at 13.
29. Update: Public Health Surveillance for HIV Infection-United States, 1989 and 1990,
39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 853, 853 (1990).
30. HIV-positive refers to a positive result from one of two tests which are used to detect
HIV antibodies in the blood. See AIDS Disabilities, supra note 18, at 9-10. An antibody is a
protein substance that the body produces in response to an infectious agent. Id. These tests do
not detect the actual presence of HIV, but the presence of HIV antibodies is evidence of expo-
sure to HIV. Id. A number of states have recently enacted legislation restricting the use of
HIV tests as a condition of employment. State Labor Law Developments, 6 LAB. LAW. 497,
540-43 (1990).
31. Zuercher, A Look at the Latest AIDS Projections for the United States, HEALTH AFF.,
Summer 1990, at 163, 164, 169.
32. Estimates of HIVPrevalence and Projected AIDS Cases: Summary of a Workshop, Oct
31-Nov. 1, 1989, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 110, 117 table 2 (1989). The
CDC also projected that 145,000 to 192,000 deaths from AIDS would be reported during this
period. Id.
June 1991] 1253
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1247
These future AIDS cases will place an increasing burden on health
care delivery systems.3 The CDC has estimated that the cost of provid-
ing medical care to AIDS patients in 1992 alone will be between five and
thirteen billion dollars.14 About one-third of these expenditures will be
paid by private health insurance--most of which is provided through
employer-sponsored group health insurance plans.36
B. Limiting or Excluding Group Health Insurance to AIDS Victims
Health insurance coverage is especially important to a person with
AIDS.37 The estimated cost of treating an AIDS case from diagnosis to
death ranges from $23,00038 to $147,O0. 39 Inability of an AIDS victim
to obtain adequate health insurance coverage can result in financial insol-
vency and lack of access to medical care.'" The primary vehicle through
33. Id. at 119.
34. 1988 AIDS Update, supra note 25, at 46. These cost estimates may be understated,
because many manifestations of AIDS are not reportable to the CDC under the current defini-
tion of an AIDS case. Id.
35. See Levit, Freeland & Waldo, National Health Care Spending Trends: 1988, HEALTH
AFF., Summer 1990, at 171, 174 exhibit 3 (32% of national health care expenditures in 1988
paid by private health insurance). In 1989, group health insurers paid approximately $455
million in AIDS-related health claims. Woolsey, AIDS Claims Hit $1 Billion, Bus. INS., Oct.
29, 1990, at 2, 2.
36. Levit, Freeland & Waldo, supra note 35, at 177. Of the 181.4 million Americans cov-
ered by private health insurance in 1987, approximately 146.9 million, or 81%, were covered
by employer-sponsored group health insurance plans. Id. Almost all full-time employees of
medium and large companies were covered by such plans. Id.
37. For general discussions of insurance coverage and AIDS, see A.B.A. AIDS COORDI-
NATING COMM., AIDS: THE LEGAL ISSUES 116, 116-34 (Discussion Draft 1988) [hereinafter
AIDS LEGAL ISSUES]; ACLU, supra note 5, at 24-26; R. JARVIS, M. CLOSEN, D. HERMANN
& A. LEONARD, AIDS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 129-53 (1991); Curiale & Estreicher, Communi-
cable Diseases in the Workplace, 309 PRACTISING L. INST. 325, 325-32 (1986); Dickens, Legal
Rights and Duties in the AIDS Epidemic, 239 Sci. 580, 582 (1988); Scherzer, Insurance, in
AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 185, 185-200 (1987) [hereinafter Scherzer,
Insurance]; Scherzer, Insurance, in AIDS LEGAL GUIDE 5-1, 5-1 to 5-8 (2d ed. 1987);
Scherzer, AIDS-Related Issues, supra note 7, at VIII-1 to VIII-16; Wilson, Health Insurance,
in AIDS AND THE LAW 195, 195-201 & Supp. 65, 65-67 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
38. Andrulis, Beers, Bentley & Gage, The Provision and Financing of Medical Care for
AIDS Patients in U.S. Public and Private Teaching Hospitals, 258 J. A.M.A. 1343, 1346 (1987).
39. Scherzer, Insurance, supra note 37, at 189 (reporting cost estimates from $28,000 to
$147,000); see also Bloom & Carliner, The Economic Impact of AIDS in the United States, 239
ScI. 604, 606 (1988) (estimating $80,000 maximum cost); Hellinger, National Forecasts of the
Medical Care Costs of AIDS: 1988-1992, 25 INQUIRY 469, 470 (1988) (estimating lifetime
costs of $60,000). Some of these estimates do not include the use of azidothymidine (AZT)
(also called zidovudine or Retrovir), currently the only drug approved to treat HIV infection.
O'Reilly, The Inside Story of the AIDS Drug, FORTUNE, Nov. 5, 1990, at 112, 113. The cur-
rent annual cost for the drug is approximately $3000. Id. at 129. The most recent studies
suggest that the lifetime cost of treating an AIDS patient is declining. Hellinger, supra, at 475.
40. AIDS LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 37, at 116.
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which persons with AIDS obtain health insurance is employer-sponsored
group health insurance plans;4 AIDS victims have a difficult time ob-
taining individual health insurance coverage.42
41. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
42. An HIV-infected person's access to individual health insurance coverage may be re-
stricted in several ways. First, an insurer may exclude AIDS as a covered condition under the
terms of the health insurance policy. Schemer, Insurance, supra note 37, at 190. Some states
have outlawed this practice, and require insurers to cover AIDS under individual and group
health insurance policies as any other illness. Scherzer, AIDS-Related Issues, supra note 7, at
VIII-5; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Second, an insurer may refuse individual health insurance coverage to HIV-infected per-
sons through underwriting practices, by requiring applicants to submit to tests or questions
before coverage is accepted, such as: (1) HIV tests, (2) medical tests to detect diminished
immune system function, or (3) application questions about HIV infection, AIDS, or lifestyle.
AIDS LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 37, at 122-28. Some states limit the use of HIV tests in
health insurance applications. Id. at 127; see, e.g., IOWA CODE § 505.16 (1989) (prohibiting
HIV testing for insurance coverage without informed consent of applicant). Some states, how-
ever, still permit the use of tests that detect an impaired immune system, but that do not detect
the presence of HIV. Curiale & Estreicher, supra note 37, at 328-29; see, eg., Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 191.650 (Supp. 1990). California prohibits the use of HIV tests to determine eligibility for
health insurance coverage. CAL. INS. CODE § 799.09 (West Supp. 1991). Many states and
health insurers have adopted National Association of Insurance Commissioner guidelines
which prohibit the use of lifestyle questions in health insurance underwriting. AIDS LEGAL
ISSUES, supra note 37, at 126.
California provides an example of a state that restricts insurers' ability to limit coverage
for HIV-infected persons through underwriting practices. Recently enacted legislation prohib-
its life and disability insurers from discriminating in eligibility and rates on the basis of sexual
orientation. CAL. INS. CODE § 10140 (West Supp. 1991). Health insurance is considered disa-
bility insurance under the California Insurance Code. Id. § 106 (West 1972). A life or disabil-
ity insurer may not:
[C]onsider sexual orientation in its underwriting criteria or [ utilize marital status,
living arrangements, occupation, gender, beneficiary designation, zip codes or other
territorial classification ... for the purpose of establishing sexual orientation or deter-
mining whether to require a test for the presence of the human immunodeficiency
virus or antibodies to that virus, where that testing is otherwise permitted by law.
Id. § 10140(b) (West Supp. 1991); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1365.5 (West
Supp. 1991) (health care service plans); CAL. INS. CODE § 799.05 (West Supp. 1991) (prohibit-
ing use of marital status, suspected homosexuality or bisexuality in determining whether to
require HIV test, if allowed, of insurance applicant); id. § 11512.193 (nonprofit hospital ser-
vice plans).
Third, even if a policy is issued, policy provisions may restrict coverage. For example, a
pre-existing conditions limitation may limit the amount or duration of coverage for medical
conditions existing at or before the time the policy takes effect. AIDS LEGAL ISSUES, supra
note 37, at 129. These restrictions may exist for a limited period of time or may be permanent.
Whether asymptomatic HIV infection constitutes a pre-existing condition with respect to
AIDS is unclear, see Curiale & Estreicher, supra note 37, at 329, especially since many HIV-
infected persons may never develop AIDS, see Zuercher, supra note 31, at 169. In addition,
most individual insurance policies contain a rescission provision, which allows the insurer to
rescind the policy if there has been a material misrepresentation of the health qualifications for
the insurance. Scherzer, AIDS-Related Issues, supra note 7, at VIII-6. During a limited pe-
riod of time after the coverage takes effect, the contestability period, the insurer can contest
and rescind the policy if there has been such a misrepresentation. Id. This could occur if an
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Even though many employers provide group health insurance to
their employees,43 there is increasing concern among employers that the
cost of providing these benefits is outpacing their ability to fund them.'
Employers have been especially concerned about providing group health
insurance coverage to employees with AIDS because of anticipated
costs.4 5 Consequently, employers have taken a number of measures to
control costs in their group health insurance plans.46
Among the group health plan cost containment techniques used by
employers, self-funding (or self-insuring) continues to grow in popular-
ity.47 One of the primary benefits to the employer of self-funding is the
avoidance of state laws relating to employee benefit plans, 48 such as those
which prohibit the exclusion or limitation of health insurance coverage
HIV-positive person, seeking insurance for his or her anticipated medical care, fails to disclose
HIV infection on the insurance application. Id.
43. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
44. See Geisel, Employers' Health Costs Rise 1Z1%, Bus. INS., Jan. 28, 1991, at 1, 86
(survey of 1955 employers showed per employee health plan costs, including medical, dental
and vision, were $3217 in 1990 and $2748 in 1989; total health plan costs increased 17.1% in
1990, 16.7% in 1989, and 18.6% in 1988); Levit, Freeland & Waldo, supra note 35, at 177
(employer health care costs grew from 2% of compensation in 1965 to 6% of compensation in
1987). Between 1977 and 1987, health care expenditures grew at an annual rate of 10.8%,
compared to 7.8% for the rest of the economy. Fuchs, The Health Sector's Share of the Gross
National Product, 247 Sci. 534, 535 table 2 (1990). "The health care sector's share of the gross
national product [grew from] under 5% in the late 1940s to more than 11% in the late 1980s
.... '" Id. at 534. In 1989, national health care spending grew 11.1% from 1988, the largest
increase in seven years, and accounted for 11.6% of gross national product. Rosenblatt, U.S.
Medical Spending Soars 11% During 1989, L.A. Times, Dec. 21, 1990, at A4, col. 1.
45. See Woolsey, supra note 35, at 2 (survey of health insurers and employers estimated
AIDS-related group health and accident claims were $455 million in 1989, an 83% increase
from 1988).
46. Levit, Freeland & Waldo, supra note 35, at 177. Common group health plan cost
containment measures include: (1) coverage limitations and exclusions, (2) cost sharing
through deductibles and coinsurance, (3) coordination of benefits with other plans, (4) pre-
existing conditions limitations, (5) waiting periods for coverage, (6) pre-admission testing, (7)
hospital utilization review, (8) hospital audits, (9) second surgical opinions, (10) coverage for
ambulatory surgical centers, hospices, skilled nursing, and home health care, (11) case man-
agement, (12) health education and promotion, (13) health maintenance organizations, (14)
preferred provider organizations, (15) cafeteria plans, (16) managed care plans, and (17) self-
insuring or self-funding. Sieverts, Health Cost Containment Strategies, in EMPLOYEE BENE-
Frrs HANDBOOK 36:1-36:23 (J. Mamorsky ed. 1987); Williams, Health Care Cost-Containment
Techniques, in THE HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 10, at 251, 251-72.
47. Woolsey, More Small Firms Self-Fund Benefits, Bus. INS., Jan. 28, 1991, at 3, 12-14.
A survey of 1955 employers showed 59% self-funded their group health plans in 1990 com-
pared to 52% in 1989, the largest annual increase in self-funding since 1986. Id. at 3. Of these
self-funding employers, 27% were totally self-funded, while 73% purchased some form of
stop-loss insurance to limit their liability if health care costs exceeded predetermined self-
funded limits. Id. Small employers-those with fewer than 500 employees-reported a 23.3%
increase in self-funding their group health plans, from 30% in 1989 to 37% in 1990. Id.
48. Harker, supra note 10, at 707, 708; see Woolsey, supra note 47, at 14 (self-funding
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for AIDS.4 9 Self-funding may allow an employer to discriminate against
an employee on the basis of his or her illness or condition by limiting or
denying state-mandated health insurance coverage, while continuing to
provide coverage for other illnesses or conditions.5 0 In fact, self-funding
is a recommended technique among benefits consultants for employers to
save health care expenses.5 ' The avoidance of state statutory require-
ments by employers is possible because ERISA generally preempts state
laws relating to self-funded employee benefit plans. 2
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Most states prohibit discriminatory practices in employee benefits
through insurance or employment discrimination laws; 3 however, em-
ployers can self-fund54 their group health benefits and generally avoid
these state mandates through ERISA preemption. 5 Furthermore, ER-
ISA generally does not prohibit the imposition of coverage limitations on
a particular illness or injury in a group health plan. 6 Through self-fund-
allows employers flexibility in designing and administering health care plans because ERISA
exempts such plans from state-imposed benefit requirements).
49. Woolsey, supra note 47, at 14; see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
50. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 409 (1990).
51. Woolsey, Most Health Plans Now Self-Funded, Bus. INs., Jan. 29, 1990, at 3, 10.
52. FMC, 111 S. Ct. at 409. See infra notes 122-37 for a discussion of FMC, which clar-
fled the distinction between insured and self-insured employee benefit plans with respect to
ERISA preemption.
53. See supra notes 6-7 for a listing of some of these state laws.
54. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
55. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 409 (1990).
56. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 201(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1)
(1988) (group health benefits are not subject to ERISA vesting requirements). See infra notes
168-71 and accompanying text, describing how ERISA does not create a legally enforceable
right to benefits under a group health plan. For example, in McGann v. H & H Music Co., a
case of first impression in the federal courts, a Texas district court granted summary judgment
for the employer, holding that the imposition of a cap for AIDS coverage in a self-funded
group health plan did not constitute illegal discrimination under ERISA. 742 F. Supp. 392,
394 (S.D. Tex. 1990), appeal filed, No. 90-2672 (5th Cir. July 27, 1990); see Geisel, Self-
Insurers Can Limit AIDS Benefits, Bus. INs., Aug. 6, 1990, at 1, 1. In McGann, the plaintiff
informed the defendant employer that he had been diagnosed with AIDS. 742 F. Supp. at 393.
Subsequently, the defendant changed the group health plan from an insured to a self-funded
basis, and reduced lifetime benefits for AIDS from $1 million to $5,000. Id. Shortly thereaf-
ter, the plaintiff exhausted the new AIDS lifetime maximum benefit. Brief for Plaintiff-Appel-
lant at 5, McGann v. H & H Music Co., No. 90-2672 (5th Cir. filed July 27, 1990), appeal from
742 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990). Because of his condition, it was highly unlikely that the
plaintiff could obtain individual health insurance coverage. Id.; see supra note 42 and accom-
panying text. In determining that the reduction in benefits did not violate ERISA, the court
noted that the defendant's actions were consistent with the primary purpose of ERISA-to
protect the financial solvency of employee benefit plans-and not taken to discriminate against
the plaintiff. McGann, 742 F. Supp. at 393-94. The court added that the plaintiff "was not
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ing, employers can discriminate against employees with AIDS by exclud-
ing or limiting coverage for AIDS, while continuing to provide full
coverage for other catastrophic or chronic illnesses.
Employers commonly design group health plans with features to
help moderate the growth of health insurance costs. 57 In spite of their
strong interest in containing costs, employers rarely target a particular
illness or condition for reduced coverage .5  Thus, an employer who
reduces coverage for AIDS, claiming that the change is motivated by
actual or anticipated expenses, but who continues to cover other illnesses
at usual levels, may be discriminating against employees with AIDS for
reasons other than cost reduction, such as irrational fears about infection
or a dislike for groups most at risk for the disease.5 9
entitled [under ERISA] to health benefits whose terms never change." Id. at 394. The court
did not address the issue of whether the AIDS limitation violated a Texas statute that prohibits
employment discrimination based on disability. See TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k,
§ 5.01 (Vernon 1987).
57. Hall, Designing Medical Care Expense Plans, in THE HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYEE BEN-
EFrrs, supra note 10, at 101, 101-03. See supra note 46 and accompanying text for a discussion
of various cost containment techniques used by employers.
58. See Lipton, Supplemental Major Medical and Comprehensive Plans, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 10, at 163, 173. An overwhelming number of
group health plans limit coverage for outpatient treatment of mental and nervous disorders, or
alcohol and drug dependency, but provide full coverage for inpatient treatment of these condi-
tions. Id. These limitations generally operate by requiring the plan participant to share in a
greater portion of the costs than other illnesses or conditions covered by the plan. Id. The
primary rationale, however, for these limitations is not to moderate or reduce employer costs.
Instead, participants are asked to have a greater financial stake in their care because of the
somewhat more discretionary nature of the treatments for these conditions. See id. Most
other common limitations and exclusions in group health plans do not limit coverage for spe-
cific illnesses or conditions, but limit certain treatments, such as: (1) treatment not required
because of illness or accidental injury, (2) cosmetic surgery, (3) custodial care, (4) dental care,
(5) routine health examinations, (6) elective items, (7) occupational accidents or sicknesses, (7)
eyeglasses, (8) hearing aids, and (9) treatment required because of war. Id. at 176-77.
59. One commentator has argued that the ability of employers to deny AIDS coverage in
the midst of a serious epidemic exposes the broader problems of our entire health care system.
Padgug & Oppenheimer, AIDS, Health Insurance, and the Crisis of Community, 5 NOTRE
DAME J.L., ETmIcs & PuB. POL'Y 35, 47-51 (1990). Employers are self-funding their health
insurance plans in increased numbers, and moving away from the traditional role of insurance
to spread risks among a large group of individuals, to excluding and narrowing coverage to
reduce costs. Id. at 38-40. Health insurance coverage has moved towards a policy of exclusion
rather than inclusion, and because persons most likely to contract AIDS, gay men and intrave-
nous drug users, are often scorned by American society, persons with AIDS are highly suscep-
tible to having AIDS coverage denied or limited. Id. at 37. Even worse, persons with AIDS
are often perceived as undeserving of sympathy because they "voluntarily" contracted the dis-
ease, or because the behavior which resulted in the disease was "immoral." See id. See Hunt-
ley, supra note 5, at 2, for a discussion of an employer that excluded "voluntarily contracted"
AIDS from health insurance coverage. Denying health insurance coverage for AIDS because
the disease was "voluntarily contracted" is analogous to denying coverage for a skiing acci-
dent, because the accident victim voluntarily assumed the risk.
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If reducing costs is the primary reason for limiting coverage for a
particular illness or condition, an employer should probably also limit
coverage for other catastrophic or chronic illnesses or treatments, such as
heart attacks and organ transplants.' When these conditions can result
in medical expenses far in excess of AIDS61 and these illnesses continue
to be covered at full levels by an employer who has limited coverage for
AIDS, there is a strong implication that the AIDS coverage limitation
has been motivated by reasons other than reducing expenses.62 In addi-
tion, there is substantial nationwide evidence that employers discriminate
against HIV-infected persons because of a perception that costs will in-
crease, whether or not this is substantiated in fact.6 3 Employers may
reduce AIDS coverage for discriminatory reasons" because there is still
a high degree of stigma associated with AIDS and HIV disease in the
United States.65 Finally, if health care costs are rising at levels beyond
the ability of an employer to fund, an employer has available a wide
range of non-discriminatory measures to help address the problem,66 in-
cluding reducing coverage limits for all illnesses and conditions to the
same level.
ERISA provides the vehicle through which this discrimination can
60. One insurance company report noted that the medical costs for AIDS care, estimated
at between $50,000 to $100,000 (without AZT treatments), were not exceptionally high when
compared to the lifetime costs for other serious impairments, such as: (1) myocardial infarc-
tion (heart attack)-$66,837; (2) cancer of the digestive system-47,542; (3) leukemia
(adult)-$28,636; and (4) paraplegia (resulting from auto accidents)-$68,700. EQUICOR-
EQUITABLE HCA CORP., AIDS AND EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFIT PLANS 6 (1988). Autolo-
gous bone marrow transplants, a promising new cancer therapy, cost over $75,000, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 27, 1990, at Cl, col. 5, and may cost as much as $125,000, id., Nov. 12, 1990, at
Al, col. 6. Heart transplants generally cost about $150,000, while liver transplants cost, on
average, about $120,000. Id., Apr. 29, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 1. One report described an em-
ployer's consternation at having been billed $1.25 million under its self-funded medical plan
for an employee's spouse, who was the first person to receive a heart, liver and kidney trans-
plant in the same operation. Id.
61. See supra notes 38-39 for a discussion of the cost estimates for treating AIDS.
62. ACLU, supra note 5, at 2.
63. Id. A Los Angeles insurance broker was recently ordered to pay $646,800 in damages
for failing to comply with an agreement to provide health insurance benefits, after receiving a
tip that some of the covered employees had AIDS, or had tested positive for HIV. Woolsey,
AIDS Group Wins Jury Award After Cover Is Denied, Bus. INs., Apr. 8, 1991, at 1, 1. Even if
the information had been true, there was no evidence that the AIDS cases would have in-
creased the costs of health insurance, or provided a legitimate reason to deny coverage. See id.
64. The reported cases in which employers have reduced coverage for AIDS, see supra
note 5, support this conclusion, especially where the benefit plans limited coverage for "volun-
tarily contracted" AIDS or expenses resulting from "lifestyle choices."
65. Id. at 1-2.
66. See supra note 46 and accompanying text for a listing of common group health plan
cost containment measures.
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occur.67 Thus, a gap in the law exists which permits employers to dis-
criminate against employees with AIDS with respect to their health care
benefits.
IV. ANALYSIS
This section analyzes federal and state statutes which appear at first
blush to protect employees from having AIDS coverage restricted by an
employee benefit plan. ERISA preemption68 is first discussed, because it
is through this doctrine that employers can avoid state laws that would
otherwise prohibit them from reducing AIDS coverage in group health
plans.69 This section then explores the primary ERISA sections that ap-
pear to offer some relief to employees with AIDS facing group insurance
restrictions: vesting,70 reporting and disclosure,71 interference with pro-
tected rights,7 2 and fiduciary duties.73 It concludes that ERISA is gener-
ally ineffective to protect employees with AIDS in this situation. Finally,
this section discusses and analyzes two important federal statutes prohib-
iting employment discrimination in the context of a restrictive AIDS
plan provision: the Rehabilitation Act of 197374 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990.
75
A. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA )
Congress passed ERISA,76 in substantial part, to protect "the con-
tinued well-being and security of millions of employees and their depen-
dents [who are] directly affected by [employee benefit] plans.")
77
Employer-sponsored group health insurance plans are covered by ER-
ISA as employee welfare benefit plans.78
67. See McGann, 742 F. Supp. 392.
68. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988).
69. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 409 (1990); see supra notes 6-7 and accompa-
nying text.
70. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1988).
71. Id. §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031.
72. Id. § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
73. Id. §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114.
74. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988).
75. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 327 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
76. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988)).
77. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)
(1988).
78. Id. § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). ERISA defines an "employee welfare benefit plan" or
"welfare plan" as "any plan, fund, or program... maintained by an employer.., for the
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insur-
[Vol. 24:1247
June 1991] LIMITING HEALTH BENEFITS FOR AIDS 1261
1. ERISA preempts state laws mandating AIDS coverage in self-
funded group health plans
a. federal preemption in general
Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,79 as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, federal law preempts
state law in three circumstances.80 First, Congress can preempt state law
to the extent its statutes express this intent.81 Thus, preemption "funda-
mentally is a question of congressional intent."82 Second, if Congress
does not articulate its intent through express statutory language, state
law is preempted if Congress intends to exclusively "occupy the field" of
conduct regulated by the law.83 Third, state law is "pre-empted to the
extent that it actually conflicts with federal law."84 ERISA meets the
first of these three tests: it expressly preempts state laws relating to em-
ployee benefit plans.8"
b. the broad scope of ERISA preemption
The avoidance of state insurance and employment discrimination
laws by employers is possible because of the broad scope ofERISA pre-
ance or otherwise... medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, [or] death." Id. A plan participant is defined as "any employee
or former employee of an employer.., who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of
any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer." Id. § 3(7),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(7).
79. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ....").
80. English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 (1990). For additional discussion
of the three circumstances in which federal law preempts state law, see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
81. English, 110 S. Ct. at 2275.
82. Id.
83. Id. Congressional intent to occupy a field can be inferred in two situations: (1) where
the federal law is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it," or (2) where a federal law "touch[es] a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject." Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)). Congressional intent to preempt state laws, however, must be "'clear and
manifest'" where "the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally
occupied by the States." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
84. English, 110 S. Ct. at 2275. A conflict can arise: (1) if a person cannot comply with
both state and federal law, or (2) if the state law is an obstacle to accomplishing the objectives
of Congress. Id.
85. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 514, 29 U.S.C. 1144 (1988); see
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732-39 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 95-100 (1983).
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emption described in section 514.6 This section states that ERISA
"shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may... relate to
any employee benefit plan."'8 7 An exception to this broad preemption
language is contained in the "saving clause" of section 514, which ex-
empts from preemption "any law of any State which regulates insurance,
banking, or securities.""8 An exception to the saving clause is the
"deemer clause," which states that "an employee benefit plan.., shall
[not] be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer.., or to be
engaged in the business of insurance... for purposes of any law of any
State purporting to regulate insurance companies, [or] insurance con-
tracts." 9 Accordingly, ERISA prevents states from attempting to regu-
late employee benefit plans by treating plans as insurers. In a series of
cases interpreting these provisions, the Supreme Court has gradually de-
fined the breadth of ERISA preemption.
i. relating to an employee benefit plan
In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,90 the Supreme Court broadly interpreted
the scope of ERISA preemption.91 The Court stated that ERISA pre-
emption is not limited to state laws purporting to affect employee benefit
plans, or even state laws affecting subject matters covered by ERISA.92
Instead, the preemptive scope of ERISA is intended to be broad, and
applies even if a state law only indirectly affects an employee benefit
plan.93 For example, a state law that requires employers to provide cer-
tain employee benefits, rather than mandating that benefit plans provide
such coverage, is preempted by ERISA because it relates to benefit
plans.94 Similarly, a state employment discrimination law relating to
86. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 514, 29 U.S.C, § 1144.
87. Id. § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
88. Id. § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
89. Id. § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
90. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
91. See id. at 96-97 ("A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan... if it has a connection
with or reference to such a plan.").
92. Id. at 98.
93. Id.; see, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524-25 (1981) (state
law prohibiting pension plans from offsetting workers' compensation benefits indirectly regu-
lated ERISA plans and was preempted under section 514).
94. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Prevost, 915 F.2d 787, 788 (2d Cir. 1990) (state law
requiring employers to continue welfare coverage for employees eligible for workers' compen-
sation benefits preempted by ERISA), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 1415 (1991); Standard Oil Co. of
Cal. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 766 (9th Cir. 1980) (state law regulating employers and em-
ployee benefits they provide relates to employee benefit plans within meaning of ERISA sec-
tion 514(a)), aff'd mer., 454 U.S. 801 (1981). A New Jersey court recently held that a portion
of a state law, requiring employers to provide health care benefits during certain employee
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benefits provided under a group health plan would probably be pre-
empted by ERISA.
ii. the saving and deemer clauses
The Supreme Court first interpreted the saving clause of ERISA in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.95 The Court held that
a state statute, which mandated minimum mental health care benefits in
group health insurance policies, regulated insurance within the meaning
of the saving clause, and therefore was saved from ERISA preemption.96
The Court set forth three primary reasons for its decision. First, the
plain language of the statute supported an interpretation that state-man-
dated benefit laws regulating group insurance contracts regulated insur-
ance. 97 Second, had Congress intended to preempt state regulation of
insurance contracts, "it would have been unnecessary for the deemer
clause explicitly to exempt such laws from the saving clause when they
are applied directly to benefit plans."98 Third, the Court relied on cases
defining insurance under another federal statute.99 Under the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act,"c° state-mandated benefit laws meet the judicially cre-
ated criteria for determining whether a practice constitutes the "business
of insurance."10'
By drawing a distinction between employee benefit plans and insur-
ance contracts in the deemer clause, the Court recognized that its hold-
ing created a distinction between insured and self-insured plans: insured
plans are subject to indirect regulation by the states, while self-insured
plans are not.10 2 Also, the third element of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act's "business of insurance" test-whether the practice is limited to en-
leaves of absence, was preempted by ERISA. Update: N.J. High Court Strikes Statute Requir-
ing Benefits During Leave, Bus. INs., Apr. 8, 1991, at 1, 1.
95. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
96. Id. at 758.
97. Id. at 739-40. The Massachusetts statute required any health insurance policy that
provided hospital and surgical coverage, or any benefit plan that had such coverage, to provide
minimum levels of coverage for expenses arising from mental or nervous disorders. Id. at 729-
30 & 730 n.11.
98. Id. at 741.
99. Id. at 742.44.
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982).
101. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 742-44. The three McCarran-Ferguson Act's "business
of insurance" criteria are: " '[1] whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading
a policyholder's risk; [2] whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship
between the insurer and the insured; and [3] whether the practice is limited to entities within
the insurance industry."' Id. at 743 (quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S.
119, 129 (1982)).
102. Id. at 747.
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tities within the insurance industry-does not apply to self-funded em-
ployee welfare plans." 3 As a result, employers can avoid state insurance
laws that would otherwise require coverage for AIDS, by self-funding
their group health plans."
The Supreme Court further expanded the scope of ERISA preemp-
tion in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.105 In Pilot Life, the Court
applied the Metropolitan Life saving clause analysis and held that state
common-law tort and contract actions asserting improper claims
processing under an employee benefit plan were not saved from ERISA
preemption. 106 The Court found that the common-law causes of action
at issue clearly related to an employee benefit plan and therefore fell
under the general preemption clause, section 514(a). °7 These causes of
action, however, did not regulate insurance such that they could be saved
from ERISA preemption under the saving clause.108 Importantly, the
Court found that allowing state causes of action for improper processing
of employee benefit plan claims would violate the congressional intent for
ERISA to provide the exclusive enforcement vehicle for such claims
under section 502(a). °9 Courts following Pilot Life have denied all state
103. Id. at 743. ("[Mlandated-benefit statutes impose requirements only on insurers, with
the intent of affecting the relationship between the insurer and the policyholder.").
104. See, e.g., Mullenix v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 1406 (1lth Cir. 1990)
(state insurance law purporting to mandate chiropractic coverage in self-insured employee
benefit plan preempted by ERISA); Gonzales v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 901 F.2d 446 (5th
Cir. 1990) (self-insured ERISA plans not directly or indirectly subject to state insurance regu-
lation); Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1989) (self-insured benefits fund not subject
even to indirect state regulation); Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d
416 (7th Cir. 1988) (self-insured medical plan not subject to state law claims), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 856 (1988); United Food & Commercial Workers v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir.
1986) (self-insured welfare plan not subject to state anti-subrogation law).
105. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
106. Id. at 57.
107. Id. at 47.
108. Id. at 47-52. The Court stated that under a "common-sense" view the state law did
not regulate insurance because, in order to regulate insurance, a law must be specifically di-
rected toward the insurance industry rather than "just have an impact on the insurance indus-
try." Id. at 50. The state law also failed to meet two of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
"business of insurance" criteria, because the law did not have the effect of spreading policy-
holder risk and did "not define the terms of the relationship between the insurer and the in-
sured." Id. at 50-51. For a discussion of the three elements of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
"business of insurance" test see supra note 101.
109. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52-54; see 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) (1988). "[Ihe inclusion of certain
remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely under-
mined if ERISA-plan participants ... were free to obtain remedies under state law that Con-
gress rejected in ERISA." Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54. The Court, in Pilot Life, described
section 502(a) of ERISA as a "comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a care-
ful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public
interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans." Id. See infra notes 159-61
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causes of action brought against ERISA employee benefit plans.1 '
iii. preemption of state causes of action explained
Despite the Supreme Court's expansive view of ERISA preemption,
some limits have been placed on that preemption by the Court's decision
in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service."' There, the Court
held that a state general garnishment statute, which could be used to
collect judgments against employee welfare benefit plan participants, was
not preempted by ERISA."12 In finding that Congress did not intend "to
forbid the use of state-law mechanisms of executing [creditor] judgments
against ERISA welfare benefit plans,""' 3 the Court concluded that the
state general garnishment law did not "relate to" such plans.' There-
and accompanying text for the pertinent language of section 502(a). In a companion case to
Pilot Life, the Court described section 502(a) as "provid[ing] an exclusive federal cause of
action for resolution of [employee benefit plan] disputes." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Tay-
lor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). These interpretations of section 502(a) as an exclusive remedy are
consistent with the rationale underlying section 514 preemption, discussed infra at notes 143-
44 and accompanying text, and strongly suggest that state employment discrimination laws
that relate to an employee benefits plan would not be available as remedies separate from
ERISA.
110. See, e.g., Mullenix, 912 F.2d 1406 (breach of contract and statutory bad faith claims
denial); Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1990) (wrongful
discharge based on age); Gonzales, 901 F.2d 446 (state law claims); Perkins v. Time Ins. Co.,
898 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1990) (tortions breach of contract); Ramirez v. Inter-Continental Ho-
tels, 890 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1989) (statutory unfair methods of competition, unfair and decep-
tive acts or practices in business of insurance); McMahan v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
888 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1989) (breach of contract); Farlow v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 874
F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1989) (fraudulent misrepresentation and negligence); Cantrell v. Great
Republic Ins. Co., 873 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1989) (breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and wrongful denial of existence of health policy); Makar v. Health Care Corp., 872
F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1989) (state common law claims); Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d
1290 (5th Cir. 1989) (breach of contract); Davidian v. Southern Cal. Meat Cutters Union, 859
F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1988) (fraud, deceit, breach of fiduciary duty, and bad faith); Kanne v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1988) (breach of contract, breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, statutory delay of
claims payment), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989); Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs
Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1988) (fraud and intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Reilly, 846 F.2d 416 (breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, fraud, and bad faith);
Belasco v. W.K.P. Wilson & Sons, 833 F.2d 277 (11th Cir. 1987) (fraud and bad faith); Cathey
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. C-8323 (rex. Jan. 30, 1991) (LEXIS, States library, Tex file)
(misrepresentation, common law and statutory causes of action). But see Memorial Hosp. Sys.
v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1990) (claim of deceptive practice under
state insurance code not preempted by ERISA).
111. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
112. Id. at 841. The Court found, however, that a state garnishment statute which was
specifically directed at ERISA welfare benefit plans was preempted. Id. at 830.
113. Id. at 831. According to the Court, this congressional intent applies even when state
laws "prevent plan participants from receiving their benefits." Id. at 831-32.
114. Id. at 831.
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fore, Mackey somewhat weakens the expansive interpretation of "relates
to" as described in Shaw and Pilot Life.
1
1
5
Notwithstanding Mackey, however, a recent case, Ingersoll-Rand
Co. v. McClendon,116 reinforced the rule that state causes of action relat-
ing to employee benefit plans are preempted by ERISA.1 7 In Ingersoll-
Rand, the Texas Supreme Court had created a public policy exception to
the employment at-will doctrine by holding that a plaintiff could recover
in a wrongful discharge action when the employer's primary reason for
the discharge was to avoid benefit obligations.11 8 The United States
Supreme Court, however, held that this common-law cause of action was
preempted by ERISA on two grounds: (1) it related to ERISA employee
benefit plans;" 9 and, (2) it conflicted with section 502(a), the exclusive
remedy for rights guaranteed under ERISA.12 °
Consequently, Ingersoll-Rand illustrates that state discrimination
laws governing the employment relationship,' 21 which apply to employee
benefit plans, are preempted by ERISA. Employees afflicted with AIDS
who are saddled with AIDS limitations in self-funded group health plans
probably cannot rely on these state laws to offer protection from their
employers' denial of coverage.
iv. FMC Corp. v. Holliday strengthens ERISA preemption of state
laws purporting to regulate self-insured employee benefit
plans
In FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 2 the Supreme Court further clarified
and strengthened the ERISA preemption distinction between insured
and self-insured employee welfare benefit plans earlier addressed in Met-
ropolitan Lif. FMC Corporation maintained a self-funded employee
welfare benefit plan.' 3 The plan contained a subrogation provision,
under which plan participants agreed to reimburse the plan for any ex-
penses paid by the plan which were later paid by a third party in a liabil-
115. See id. at 841-43 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
116. 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990).
117. See id. at 483. State causes of action are also preempted when they conflict with an
ERISA remedy. Id. at 484-85.
118. Id. at 481 (citing McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (rex. 1989)).
119. Id. at 483.
120. Id. at 484-86. The Court reiterated its finding in Pilot Life that section 502(a) of
ERISA was intended to be an exclusive remedy for ERISA rights. Id. at 485. For a discus-
sion of the Court's interpretation of section 502(a) as an exclusive remedy, see supra note 109.
See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text for the pertinent language of section 502(a).
121. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
122. 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990).
123. Id. at 405.
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ity action.124 Holliday was injured in an automobile accident, and she
recovered benefits from both the FMC medical plan and the driver of the
automobile.1 25 FMC sought reimbursement for the plan expenses, but
Holiday asserted that state law precluded subrogation or reimbursement
of a tort recovery under any "program, group contract or other arrange-
ment." 126 Holliday obtained a declaratory judgment in federal district
court that the state law prohibited FMC from exercising its subrogation
rights, and the Third Circuit affirmed. 27 The Supreme Court reversed,
however, holding that the state law was preempted by ERISA.1
28
The Supreme Court first found that, because the state law related to
an employee welfare benefit plan, the law fell under the ERISA preemp-
tion clause.129 The Court thus reinforced Shaw's expansive interpreta-
tion of when a state law relates to an employee benefit plan.130 The
Court also determined that the law fell within the meaning of the saving
clause, and would only be excluded from ERISA preemption if it met the
terms of the deemer clause.
1 31
In its first direct affirmation of the distinction between self-insured
and insured employee benefit plans, the Court held that the deemer
clause exempts self-insured ERISA plans from state regulation relating
to such plans.1 32 The Court noted that the deemer clause relieves plans
from state laws purporting to regulate insurance because it forbids states
to deem employee benefit plans to be insurance companies or in the busi-
ness of insurance. 33 The Court added that its interpretation of the
124. Id. at 405.06.
125. Id. at 406.
126. Id. (referring to Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1720 (1987)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 411.
129. Id. at 407.
130. Id. at 407-08. For a discussion of Shaw, see supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
131. Id. at 409.
132. Id.
133. Id. The Court described in detail the application of the saving and deemer clauses to
self-funded and insured employee benefit plans:
[S]elf-funded ERISA plans are exempt from state regulation insofar as that regula-
tion "relate[s] to" the plans. State laws directed toward the plans are pre-empted
because they relate to an employee benefit plan but are not "saved" because they do
not regulate insurance. State laws that directly regulate insurance are "saved" but do
not reach self-funded employee benefit plans because the plans may not be deemed to
be insurance companies, other insurers, or engaged in the business of insurance for
purposes of such state laws. On the other hand, employee benefit plans that are
insured are subject to indirect state insurance regulation. An insurance company
that insures a plan remains an insurer for purposes of state laws "purporting to regu-
late insurance" after application of the deemer clause. The insurance company is
therefore not relieved from state insurance regulation. The ERISA plan is conse-
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deemer clause was consistent with both Metropolitan Life 134 and the con-
gressional intent behind ERISA preemption.135
FMC strengthens the ERISA preemption doctrine by making clear
that any state law which purports to regulate, or has any connection with
or reference to, a self-funded employee welfare benefit plan is preempted
by ERISA.'36 Consequently, state insurance or employment laws which
attempt to prohibit discriminatory AIDS coverage limitations in self-
funded health care plans,'37 even indirectly, would probably be pre-
empted, and thus, ineffective as remedies for employees with AIDS fac-
ing AIDS coverage restrictions.
Under the Supreme Court's decisions, even insured employee benefit
plans can avoid state employment discrimination laws through ERISA
preemption, as long as the laws are not interpreted to regulate insur-
ance.'38 A state employment discrimination law that prohibits discrimi-
nation in benefits based on disability arguably relates to an employee
benefit plan and is preempted by ERISA. 139 Furthermore, such a law
probably does not regulate insurance and is, therefore, not saved from
preemption under the saving clause. 4° Thus, ERISA preempts both: (1)
state insurance laws purporting to regulate self-insured employee benefit
plans; 4 ' and (2) state employment discrimination laws relating to em-
ployee benefit plans that do not regulate insurance, whether such plans
are insured or self-insured. 142
quently bound by state insurance regulations insofar as they apply to the plan's
insurer.
Id.
This decision still does not reach the question of whether a self-funded plan that carries
stop-loss coverage is subject to indirect state insurance regulation. But see Drexelbrook Eng'g
Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 710 F. Supp. 590, 598 (E.D. Pa.) (state law claims preempted where
employer self-funded group health plan and included stop-loss coverage), afl'd, 891 F.2d 280
(3d Cir. 1989). See supra note 10 for a discussion of stop-loss coverage.
134. FMC, 111 S. Ct. at 409.
135. Id. at 410.
136. See id. at 411.
137. See supra notes 6-7 for a listing of state insurance and employment discrimination laws
potentially affecting AIDS discrimination.
138. See, e.g., Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47-51.
139. See id. at 47-48.
140. See id. at 50-51. See supra notes 101, 108 and accompanying text for discussions of
when a state law regulates insurance.
141. See FMC, 111 S. Ct. at 409.
142. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47-51.
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c. ERISA's legislative history does not support preemption when an
employer is only subject to one state's mandates
The legislative history of ERISA describes the rationale underlying
the broad reading of preemption under section 514. In debate surround-
ing passage of the Act, Representative Dent stated, "With the preemp-
tion of the field [of employee benefit plans], we round out the protection
afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and incon-
sistent State and local regulation."' 43 Senator Williams proposed that
"the substantive and enforcement provisions... are intended to preempt
the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting
or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans." 1"
This legislative purpose was reiterated in Shaw, in which the Court dis-
cussed the importance of ERISA's preemption scheme in minimizing
"interference with the administration of employee benefit plans" when
the employer had employees in many states.14
5
In Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 14 the Supreme Court relied
on legislative intent to support its finding that a state statute which man-
dated a one-time severance payment to terminated employees was not
preempted by ERISA, because the employer was not required to estab-
lish "an ongoing administrative program" to comply with the law.' 47
The Court reasoned that, in the absence of administrative practices nec-
essary to provide a state-mandated-employee benefit, ERISA's purpose of
alleviating conflicting and inconsistent state regulations does not ap-
ply. 4 ' In addition, the Court found that a state-mandated benefit that
does not require the establishment of ongoing administrative practices
does not constitute an employee benefit plan, 49 thereby removing the
143. 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974).
144. Id. at 29,933.
145. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 105 n.25 ("Obligating the employer to satisfy the varied and perhaps
conflicting requirements of particular state.. . laws ... would make administration of a
uniform nationwide [benefit] plan more difficult."). In FMC, the Court reiterated this ration-
ale which underlies ERISA preemption:
To require plan providers to design their programs in an environment of differing
State regulations would complicate the administration of nationwide plans, produc-
ing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits. Thus, where a
"patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in bene-
fit program operation," we have applied the preemption clause to ensure that benefit
plans will be governed by only a single set of regulations.
111 S. Ct. at 408 (citations omitted) (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1,
11 (1987)).
146. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
147. Id. at 11-12.
148. Id. at 14-15.
149. Id. at 11-12. ERISA does not cover group insurance programs that are not funded
and administered through employers or employee organizations; therefore, these programs can
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state law from section 514 preemption.150
The Court's holding that no employee benefit plan exists if a state-
mandated benefits law does not require administrative practices to pro-
vide the benefits creates an exception to the section 514(a) general pre-
emption rule.' This exception, however, would not assist an employee
with AIDS attempting to secure benefits under an employer-sponsored
group health plan, because administrative practices are usually necessary
for the employer to have such a plan.l5 2 Yet, this reasoning could sup-
port an argument that an employer does not establish an employee bene-
fit plan if it provides a benefit without setting up accompanying
administrative practices, regardless of whether the benefit is mandated by
state law. For example, a benefit provided out of the general assets of the
company, rather than through an insurance plan, presumably would be
outside the scope of ERISA protection.'53 Therefore, an employee with
AIDS who has been denied a benefit should look beyond the substance of
the benefit to the form of its delivery.
Fort Halifax Packing seems to imply another exception to ERISA
preemption. The legislative purpose of ERISA preemption was not di-
rected at employee benefit plans that cover employees in only one state or
municipality, because these plans may not be subject to conflicting state
and local laws that preemption is intended to alleviate.154 Thus, preemp-
tion is not necessary. An employer with employees in only one state or
municipality does not fall within this ERISA preemption legislative pur-
be regulated by state laws. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) (1990). ERISA regulations set forth four
criteria to determine when a group insurance program is not covered by ERISA: (1) no contri-
butions are made by an employer or employee organization; (2) employee participation is vol-
untary; (3) the employer's or employee organization's functions, without endorsing the
program, are limited to publicity, collecting premiums through payroll deductions, and remit-
ting them to the insurer; and (4) the employer or employee organization does not receive
consideration, other than reasonable compensation, excluding profit, for administrative serv-
ices to collect premiums. Id. For example, a payroll deduction program to purchase individ-
ual automobile insurance would probably meet these criteria.
150. Fort Halifax Packing, 482 U.S. at 7-8 (section 514(a) preempts state insurance laws
relating to employee benefit plans, not to employee benefits).
151. Id. at 7-8, 11-12. In dissent, Justice White described the majority's holding as creating
a loophole in the ERISA preemption scheme and as inconsistent with congressional intent and
prior precedent. Id. at 23-26 (White, J., dissenting).
152. See R. FoSTER, supra note 4, at 29-32.
153. See Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989) (company policy of paying unused
vacation benefits from general assets did not constitute an ERISA employee welfare benefit
plan and criminal action to enforce such policy not preempted).
154. Fort Halifax Packing, 482 U.S. at 11 ("Pre-emption ensures that the administrative
practices of a benefit plan will be governed by only a single set of regulations."). This argu-
ment is only relevant with respect to self-funded plans, as insured plans are usually subject to
state regulation under the saving clause. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 746-47.
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pose merely by changing the funding mechanism of its group health in-
surance plans from insured to self-funded.' 5 Consequently, Fort Halifax
Packing, by focusing on ERISA's intent to alleviate conflicting state
laws,156 appears to weaken the insured/uninsured distinction described
in FMC. An employee with AIDS who faces a denial of AIDS benefits
under a self-funded group health insurance plan could use this argument
to undercut an employer's ERISA preemption argument. Nevertheless,
given both Representative Dent's comment that ERISA preemption was
intended to occupy the field of federal regulation of employee benefits, 5 7
and the broad scope of ERISA preemption described in Pilot Life as "de-
liberately expansive," 15s it is unlikely that a court would accept this argu-
ment without a legislative change in ERISA.
2. ERISA remedies are generally ineffective for an AIDS victim
denied coverage under a group health plan
Because of ERISA's broad preemption of state laws relating to em-
ployee benefit plans, an employee who has had AIDS coverage with-
drawn from a group health plan probably must rely primarily on ERISA
and other federal statutes for possible relief. ERISA's protections, how-
ever, are generally narrow for an employee in this situation. This section
discusses the areas of ERISA that an AIDS coverage restriction might
violate.
If ERISA rights of a plan participant are violated, section 502(a) 5 9
permits the participant to bring a civil action to "recover benefits due
... , to enforce ... rights... , or to clarify ... rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan."'" This section also permits a participant
to seek "appropriate equitable relief ... to enforce ... the terms of the
plan." '161 These remedies are intended to be exclusive for rights guaran-
155. Employers that have employees in only one state or municipality do not subject them-
selves to "conflicting or inconsistent" state laws merely because their group health benefits are
self-funded rather than insured. For an explanation of self-funding, see supra note 10 and
accompanying text. Therefore, they do not need the protection of ERISA preemption to re-
lieve their employee benefit plans from such laws. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying
text. Even so, small employers, that are most likely to have employees in only one state or
municipality, are self-funding their group health plans at a rapid rate, see supra note 47 and
accompanying text, and thus, avoiding state and local laws through ERISA preemption.
156. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
157. See 120 CONG. Rc., supra note 143, at 29,197.
158. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 45-46.
159. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)
(1988).
160. Id. § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
161. Id. § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B).
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teed under ERISA.' 62
A court must review a denial of benefits challenged under section
502(a)(1)(B) under a de novo standard.1 63 If, however, the plan adminis-
trator'6 or the plan fiduciary 6 has "discretionary authority [under the
plan] to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the
plan," a more deferential, arbitrary and capricious standard of review
applies. 
166
The ability of an employer to reduce or eliminate a benefit under an
employee benefit plan depends on the scope of ERISA protection cover-
ing the particular benefit. If an employer denies a benefit due under the
terms of the plan, a right of action is triggered under section
502(a)(1)(B). 167 If, however, an employer merely amends the terms of
the plan to withdraw AIDS coverage from participants, rather than de-
nying a benefit due under the plan, ERISA remedies are generally
ineffective.
a. section 203: vesting requirements
One of ERISA's primary protections is vesting, "an employee's
[nonforfeitable] right to his [or her] normal retirement benefit.., upon
the attainment of normal retirement age" in a pension plan.168 The defi-
162. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54. For a discussion of the Pilot Lfe reading of section 502(a) as
an exclusive remedy for ERISA rights, see supra note 109.
163. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). In the appellate
decision, the Third Circuit described the de novo standard as applying the principles of con-
tract construction, "steering a middle course between the [plaintiff's and defendant's] con-
structions of the [plan] document." Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 145
(3d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). The court also noted that industry practice and
past practice under the plan would aid in interpretation. Id. "[Tihe de novo standard of re-
view applies regardless of whether the plan at issue is funded or unfunded [i.e., welfare plan]
and regardless of whether the administrator or fiduciary is operating under a possible or actual
conflict of interest." Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
164. See infra note 174.
165. See infra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
166. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. Under this standard, a benefit claim denial is proper as long
as it is based on a good faith reasonable interpretation of the terms of the plan. Johnson v.
District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1988) (denial of liver
transplant as experimental surgery was not arbitrary or capricious). For a detailed discussion
of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review prior to Firestone, see Turza, The Judicial
Standard of Review of Benefit Denials by Fiduciaries of ERISA Welfare Plans, 1 BENEFITS L.J.
55 (1988).
167. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B).
168. Id. § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a). A pension plan "provides retirement income to
employees, or results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termi-
nation of covered employment or beyond." Id. § 3(2)(A)(i), (ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(i),
(ii).
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nition of the term "nonforfeitable" limits its use to pension plans. 16 9
Also, ERISA states that minimum vesting standards do not apply to em-
ployee welfare benefit plans.171 Consequently, ERISA's vesting require-
ments do not entitle a participant to a legally enforceable nonforfeitable
right to benefits under a group health plan. As a result, in the absence of
any implicit or explicit contrary agreement between an employer and its
employees, an employer is free to amend, alter or eliminate group health
plan benefits.'
7 1
169. Id. § 3(19), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(19). "The term 'nonforfeitable' when used with respect
to a pension benefit or right means a claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that
part of [a] ... benefit under a pension plan which arises from the participant's service, which is
unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the plan." Id. Only accrued benefits
must be nonforfeitable. Id. § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a). An accrued benefit is "an annual
benefit commencing at normal retirement age, or in the case ... of an individual account plan,
the balance of the individual's account." Id. § 3(23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23).
170. Id. § 201(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1). See supra note 78 for a definition of "employee
welfare benefit plan."
171. See, eg., Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 732 (ERISA does not regulate substantive
content of employee welfare plans); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91 (ERISA imposes vesting require-
ments only on pension plans); Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 491-92 (2d
Cir. 1988) (vesting of welfare plans rejected by Congress); Young v. Standard Oil, 849 F.2d
1039, 1045 (7th Cir.) (employer may unilaterally amend or eliminate employee welfare benefit
plan under ERISA), cert denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus.,
836 F.2d 1512, 1516 (8th Cir. 1988) (welfare benefits do not automatically vest as matter of
law), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989); Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872, 876
(8th Cir. 1987) (employee welfare benefits expressly excluded from ERISA vesting provisions);
Molnar v. Wibbelt, 789 F.2d 244,250 (3d Cir. 1986) (rights to welfare benefits do not automat-
ically vest under law); Hansen v. White Motor Corp., 788 F.2d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1986)
(Congress exempted employee welfare benefit plans from vesting requirements); Sutton v.
Weirton Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1983) (only pension bene-
fits vest), cerL denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984); UAW v. Roblin Indus., 561 F. Supp. 288, 299-300
(W.D. Mich. 1983) (ERISA vesting principle does not apply to health and life insurance bene-
fits).
The court in Moore explained the rationale behind the lack of a vesting requirement in
welfare benefit plans:
Automatic vesting was rejected [by Congress] because the costs of such plans are
subject to fluctuating and unpredictable variables.... [Miedical insurance must take
account of inflation, changes in medical practice and technology, and increases in the
costs of treatment independent of inflation. These unstable variables prevent accu-
rate predictions of future needs and costs .... [To sanction the vesting of welfare
benefits] would not only fly in the face of ERISA's plain language but would also
decrease protection for future employees and retirees.
Moore, 856 F.2d at 492.
This rationale supports an employer's ability to amend welfare plans under ERISA and is
consistent with the reasons cited by the employer for reducing coverage for AIDS in McGann
v. H & H Music Co., 742 F. Supp. 392, 393-94 (S.D. Tex.), appealfiled, No. 90-2672 (5th Cir.
July 27, 1990).
In Sutton, the court further described the intent of Congress that ERISA vesting require-
ments do not apply to unfunded retirement benefits and welfare plans:
The Act was not designed to prohibit modification of these ancillary [welfare] bene-
fits. Rather, Congress believed that the "vesting of these ancillary benefits would
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b. sections 101-111: reporting and disclosure
Even though employee welfare benefit plans are not subject to ER-
ISA vesting requirements, an employer can create a legally enforceable
right to benefits, either through a written obligation, 172 or by failing to
reserve the right to amend or change the benefits. 173 Therefore, an em-
ployee who has been denied AIDS coverage under an employer-spon-
sored group health plan should review the documents that describe the
plan.
ERISA requires employers to use a summary plan description
(SPD) to describe benefits programs to their employees. 74 An SPD
must be written in a "manner calculated to be understood by the average
plan participant, and.., sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to rea-
sonably apprise such participants ...of their rights and obligations
under the plan." 175 An SPD must contain certain information, including
"the plan's requirements respecting eligibility for participation and bene-
seriously complicate the administration and increase the cost of plans whose primary
function is to provide retirement income." An employer may change such benefits
without violating ERISA.
Sutton, 724 F.2d at 410 (citations omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
60, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMin. NEWS 4890, 4935).
172. See Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1988)
(statements in employee benefit summary plan description may be binding).
173. See Moore, 856 F.2d at 492 (employer may alter employee welfare benefit plan when
summary plan description disclaimer reserves right to amend or terminate benefits). But cf.
McKnight v. Southern Life & Health Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1566, 1570 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (disallow-
ing disclaimer in summary plan description proclaiming inconsistencies will be governed by
plan document). Because some courts have held that disclaimers in summary plan descrip-
tions have no effect, see, e.g., id.; Zittrouer v. UARCO Inc. Group Benefit Plan, 582 F. Supp.
1471, 1475 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (disclaimers in plan summary invalid), an employer may not be
able to rely on a disclaimer to avoid liability for a change in benefits or a discrepancy with the
plan document. Therefore, failure by an employer to reserve the right to amend, modify, or
terminate the plan may be irrelevant. Because other courts, however, have upheld disclaimers,
see, eg., Moore, 856 F.2d at 492; Henne v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1464, 1475
(E.D. Wis. 1987), employers are likely to reserve these rights in summary plan descriptions.
174. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1021(a)(1) (1988). Employee benefit plan administrators must provide each plan participant
with an SPD. Id. An "employee benefit plan [must] be established and maintained pursuant
to a written instrument." Id. § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). Either the plan administra-
tor is designated by the plan document or, if there is no designation, the plan sponsor is the
plan administrator. Id. § 3(16)(A)(i)-(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(i)-(ii). In the case of a sin-
gle employer who establishes and maintains an employee benefit plan, the employer is the plan
sponsor. Id. § 3(16)(B)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B)(i). An SPD must be filed with the Secre-
tary of Labor. Id. §§ 101(b), 104(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(b), 1024(a)(1). For regulations
governing general ERISA reporting and disclosure requirements, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.101-1
to 2520.104b-30 (1990).
175. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1022(a)(1) (1988).
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fits... [and] circumstances which may result in disqualification, ineligi-
bility, or denial or loss of benefits."' 176 In addition to the SPD, the plan
administrator also may write a more complete plan description.1
77
Failure to comply with ERISA reporting and disclosure require-
ments due to a procedural error usually is not sufficient to create em-
ployer liability.178  If, however, a benefit is described in the plan
description or SPD, a participant generally may enforce his or her rights
to that benefit under ERISA.
179
If an SPD contains inaccurate language, or if there is an omission,
and the SPD is inconsistent with other plan documents, an employee
may be able to enforce the SPD if he or she reasonably relied upon it and
some prejudice or harm resulted from that reliance.'8 0 This assumes,
however, that any disclaimer in the SPD has not been given effect.18" '
An employee who seeks to enforce a benefits obligation to provide
unreduced AIDS coverage in a group health plan should review the plan
documents and the employer's compliance with ERISA reporting and
disclosure requirements. As long as these requirements have been met,
and the employer has accurately described the coverage limitation, it is
unlikely that an employee would be able to rely on these ERISA provi-
sions, or the interpretive case law, for assistance in obtaining full
coverage.1
8 2
176. Id. § 102(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b).
177. Id. §§ 101(b)(2), 102(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(b)(2), 1022(a)(2). The plan description
required by section 102 consists of an SPD. See 29 U.S.C. § 1022; 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-1.
178. Henne, 660 F. Supp. at 1474 ("[F]ailure to comply with ERISA's procedural require-
ments warrants no substantive remedy unless there has been flagrant and wholesale flouting of
ERISA disclosure provisions." (citation omitted)); Freund v. Gerson, 610 F. Supp. 69, 71
(S.D. Fla. 1985) ("technical" breach of SPD requirements does not create private cause of
action).
179. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3)(B) (1988); see Hillis v. Waukesha Title Co., 576 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (E.D. Wis.
1983) (court has authority to provide remedy for misleading summary plan description under
ERISA section 502(a)(3)(B)).
180. Edwards, 851 F.2d at 137 (employee misled by summary plan description need not
prove detrimental reliance); Bachelder v. Communications Satellite Corp., 837 F.2d 519, 522-
23 (1st Cir. 1988) (reasonable or significant reliance on summary plan description required for
relief); Lee v. Union Elec. Co., 789 F.2d 1303, 1308 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 962
(1986); Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int'l Union, 732 F.2d 250, 252 (1st Cir.
1984) ("[plaintiffj must show some significant reliance upon, or possible prejudice flowing
from, the faulty [summary] plan description"); Freund, 610 F. Supp. at 71 (plaintiff must show
significant reliance upon, or prejudice from summary plan description).
181. See supra note 173 and accompanying text for a discussion of SPD disclaimers.
182. McGann, 742 F. Supp. at 394.
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c. section 510: interference with protected rights
i. statutory language
On its face, section 510 of ERISA appears to assist an employee who
is denied coverage for AIDS under a group health plan because of an
amendment. Nevertheless, amending a group health plan to limit or ex-
clude AIDS coverage probably does not constitute section 510 discrimi-
nation. Section 510 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend,
expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or benefi-
ciary for exercising any right to which he [or she] is entitled
under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, ... or for the
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which
such participant may become entitled under the plan .... 183
The primary purpose of section 510 is to prevent "unscrupulous em-
ployers from discharging or harassing their employees in order to keep
them from obtaining vested pension rights," '84 or other "statutory or
plan-based rights." ' While not necessarily indicative of the weight of
section 510 arguments, virtually all section 510 cases involve a claim that
an employee's termination is pretextual and that the real purpose is to
deny benefits to which an employee or an employee's beneficiary is
entitled.1
86
183. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
184. West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court has noted that
the prototypical claim Congress intended to cover under section 510 is one in which an em-
ployee's "termination [is] motivated by an employer's desire to prevent a pension from vest-
ing." Ingersoll-Rand, 111 S. Ct. at 485.
185. Zipf v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889, 891 (3d Cir. 1986).
186. See, eg., McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990) (em-
ployer's program to lay off employees prior to benefits eligibility violated section 510); Hen-
dricks v. Edgewater Steel Co., 898 F.2d 385, 390 (3d Cir. 1990) (terminated employee failed to
show employer intended to interfere with pension rights); Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d
586, 588 (1st Cir. 1989) (alleging wrongful termination to avoid medical plan payments to
employee's former spouse); Dister v. Continental Group, 859 F.2d 1108, 1117-18 (2d Cir.
1988) (employer's reasons for discharge were not pretext for interfering with attainment of
pension benefits); Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.) (employer's program
to lay off employees prior to benefits eligibility violated section 510), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979
(1987); Zipf, 799 F.2d at 890 (alleging discharge to prevent payment of disability benefits);
Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1239 (7th Cir. 1983) (alleging discharge to avoid
payment of medical and life insurance); Silverman v. Barbizon School of Modeling & Fashion,
720 F. Supp. 966, 973 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (alleging discharge to avoid payment of bonuses and
options); Bradley v. Capital Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 678 F. Supp. 1330, 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (alleg-
ing termination to prevent payment of medical benefits); Furcini v. Equibank, 660 F. Supp.
1436, 1445 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (employer's reasons for discharge were not pretext for avoiding
payment of severance benefits); Rose v. Intelogic Trace, 652 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (W.D. Tex.
1987) (alleging termination to avoid vesting of retirement benefits, payment of vacation and
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ii. section 510 does not support claim when group health plan is
merely amended
To support a section 510 claim, a plaintiff must establish that the
employer intended to interfere with the participant's or beneficiary's ben-
efits. 1 7 A loss of benefits incidental to the employer's action does not
violate section 510.118 It may be difficult, though, for a plaintiff to estab-
lish through direct evidence that the employer intended to interfere with
benefit rights, especially if the employer claims the benefits were denied
for another reason.1 89 Therefore, courts have analogized the elements of
a discrimination claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,19'
first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,191 to those re-
quired under ERISA section 510.192
The McDonnell Douglas discrimination test permits a plaintiff to in-
directly prove employer intent to discriminate through shifting burdens
of proof 193 First, the plaintiff has the burden of making out a prima
facie case of discrimination by demonstrating: "(1) prohibited employer
conduct (2) taken for the purpose of interfering (3) with the attainment
other benefits); Economu v. Borg-Warner Corp., 662 F. Supp. 1047, 1052 (D. Conn. 1986)
(alleging termination to prevent vesting of pension benefits), aff'd, 824 F.2d 181 (2d Cir.
1987); Ferguson v. Freedom Forge Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1157, 1161-62 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (alleg-
ing discharge caused loss of pension rights); Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1015
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (employee's discharge intended to deny advantages of employee benefit
plans); Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 556 F. Supp. 571, 575 (W.D. Pa.) (employer's reasons for
employee's discharge were pretextual, true purpose being to deprive employee of impending
pension rights), aff'd, 719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1983). In one of the few section 510 cases when
the plaintiffs were not discharged from their employment, they alleged that a retirement plan
amendment amounted to constructive discharge. See Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d
911, 922 (3d Cir. 1990), cerL denied, 1ll S. Ct. 1310 (1991).
187. Hendricks, 898 F.2d at 389; Dister, 859 F.2d at 1111; Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809,
816-17 (6th Cir. 1987); Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 851 ("essential element of proof under [section]
510 is specific intent to engage in proscribed activity").
188. Dister, 859 F.2d at 1111; Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 851.
189. See, eg., Dister, 859 F.2d at 111 (proof of specific intent is critical in section 510
cases, but it is seldom proved by direct evidence); Young v. Standard Oil, 660 F. Supp. 587,
597 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (plaintiff failed to show requisite discrimination in form of constructive
discharge), aff'd on other grounds, 849 F.2d 1039 (7th Cir. 1988).
190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
191. 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
192. Dister, 859 F.2d at 1111-12; Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 852-53; Furcini, 660 F. Supp. at
1439-40. If the plaintiff has direct evidence of specific intent to interfere with benefit rights, the
McDonnell Douglas test does not apply. Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 853. For a detailed discussion of
the application of the McDonnell Douglas title VII discrimination test to ERISA section 510,
see Collingsworth, ERISA Section 510-A Further Limitation on Arbitrary Discharges, 10 IN-
DUS. REL. L.J. 319, 330-43 (1988).
193. Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 852-53.
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of any right to which the employee may become entitled." 194 If the
plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, "the burden of production shifts
to the employer to introduce admissible evidence of a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for its challenged actions."19 If the employer carries
its burden, there is no presumption of discrimination, but the plaintiff
can "demonstrate that the employer's articulated reason is pretextual
'either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.'
' ' 196
Throughout these shifting burdens, the plaintiff bears the ultimate bur-
den of proving specific intent of the employer to interfere with benefit
rights.
19 7
An employee whose employer has limited AIDS coverage by
amending the group health plan would have difficulty meeting the prima
facie burden under the McDonnell Douglas test as applied to section 510.
The employee's obstacle is ERISA, under which an employer is free to
amend or even terminate an employee welfare benefit plan.198 Conse-
quently, the first element of the prima facie test-that the employer en-
gaged in conduct prohibited by ERISA by amending the plan-is nearly
impossible to prove.1 99
Even if an employee could establish that an employer engaged in
prohibited conduct by interfering with benefits rights, the employee still
must show that he or she is, or may become, entitled to the right under
ERISA.2 °° This may prove difficult, though, because specific levels of
benefits under a group health plan are not protected by ERISA,20 1 nor
does ERISA provide for vesting of welfare benefits.2" 2 Therefore, ER-
194. Id. at 852. In Furcini, the court described the plaintiff's prima facie case as demon-
strating: "(i) that he was a candidate for a benefit protected by ERISA; (ii) that he was denied
that benefit; and (iii) that he satisfied the conditions for receiving that benefit." Furcini, 660 F.
Supp. at 1442. The court, however, added that this test was limited to the facts of the case and
should not be applied to other factual situations. Id. The court also noted that the evidence
required to establish the plaintiff's prima facie case was much less than the evidence necessary
to prove that section 510 had been violated. Id. at 1440-42.
195. Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 853.
196. Id. at 853 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981)).
197. Id. at 852.
198. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
199. The alleged employer conduct in most section 510 cases is termination of employment.
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
200. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
201. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
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ISA does not create a protected group health insurance benefit that can-
not be amended by an employer.
This interpretation is consistent with the language of section 510,
which protects the rights a participant is or may be "entitled [to] under
the provisions of an employee benefit plan."2 °3 If the plan does not pro-
vide coverage for AIDS, or provides severely limited coverage compared
with other catastrophic illnesses, then the plan has failed to create a right
to full AIDS coverage. An employer cannot interfere with or discrimi-
nate against an employee for exercising a right that does not exist.
Whether the employer has actual intent to discriminate against a plan
participant by amending the plan to limit AIDS coverage is, therefore,
irrelevant under this analysis.
Arguably, however, it is the discriminatory intent of the employer
that converts a lawful action, such as discharge of the employee or
amendment of the plan, into a violation of section 510. A plan partici-
pant can state a section 510 claim without evidence of a continued enti-
tlement to the benefits because evidence of entitlement at the time of the
employer's action is sufficient.2' Even so, mere amendment of a plan
does not violate section 510 although the result may be a deprivation of
benefits.
When an employer discharges an employee to deprive the employee
of benefits, the employer takes affirmative steps to interfere with a benefit
right to which the employee is or may be entitled at the time of the ac-
tion. The benefit plan provisions have not changed as the result of the
discharge. Regardless of the discharge, the employee may or may not
have been entitled to continue receiving the benefits.
In contrast, when the plan is merely amended and no discharge oc-
curs, the employer has not impermissibly interfered with a benefit right
to which the employee is or may be entitled. This is true even if such
entitlement no longer exists because, under ERISA, an employer may
amend or alter an employee welfare benefit plan in the absence of a con-
trary agreement between the employer and its employees. 20 5 To find
203. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
204. See Zipf, 799 F.2d at 893 (employee need not show entitlement to benefit but for em-
ployer interference); ef. Kross, 701 F.2d at 1242-43 (rejecting restrictive interpretation of sec-
tion 510 as only protecting the attainment of benefits right, which removed participant who
already attained right from claiming section 510 violation). In Zipf, the Third Circuit stated
that whether an employer's interference is successful, or whether a participant actually would
have received the benefit in the absence of the interference, is irrelevant in a section 510 analy-
sis. Zipf, 799 F.2d at 893. A participant must show, however, that he or she had the potential
of receiving the benefits at the time of the employer's alleged interference. Id.
205. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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otherwise would beg the question of whether the employer has interfered
impermissibly with a right to which the employee is or may become enti-
fled under the plan. This is one of the issues that the Fifth Circuit should
address in the appeal in McGann v. H & H Music Co..206
If a plan participant makes out a prima facie case under the McDon-
nell Douglas test, and proves discriminatory intent, an employer can re-
but the inference with evidence of a nondiscriminatory, legitimate
business reason for the change.2°7 Courts will not, however, blindly defer
to employers' claims. For example, the Third Circuit in Gavalik v. Conti-
nental Can Co. 208 rejected an employer's argument that saving pension
costs was a legitimate business reason to avoid pension obligations. The
court explained that section 510 was intended to prevent this type of
employer interference.2 "9
If the employer meets its burden of showing a nondiscriminatory,
legitimate business reason for amending its benefit plan, a participant can
still prevail if he or she shows that the reason was pretextual, because
either a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or the
proffered reasons are unworthy of credence.210
d. sections 401-414: fiduciary duties
Another possible avenue for an employee who is denied AIDS cov-
erage under an employee welfare benefit plan is to claim that the em-
ployer breached a fiduciary duty. A fiduciary is a person who, with
respect to an employee benefit plan: (1) "exercises any discretionary au-
thority or... control [in managing] such plan," (2) "exercises any au-
206. Brief Amicus Curiae of Am. Assoc. of Retired Persons in Support of Plaintifi-Appel-
lant at 9-11, McGann v. H & H Music Co., No. 90-2672 (5th Cir. filed July 27, 1990), appeal
from 742 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
207. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
208. 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987).
209. Id. at 857 n.39. A closer look at the legislative history, however, reveals that section
510 was primarily intended to protect pension benefits, which are subject to ERISA vesting
requirements, and not welfare benefits, which do not vest under ERISA. See supra note 171
and accompanying text. Therefore, an employer's cost justification for a welfare benefit reduc-
tion is probably a legitimate business reason under section 510 and should be sufficient to meet
the employer's burden of proof. See Dister, 859 F.2d at 1112 (employer does not need to prove
that nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons actually motivated its actions, only articulate them).
To find otherwise could allow section 510 to swallow up other parts of ERISA by provid-
ing broader protections than those delineated under the vesting, fiduciary, and reporting and
disclosure requirements. Also, most group health plan benefit levels are designed with cost as
the primary consideration, and plan changes are often made because of cost. Hall, supra note
57, at 101-03. Some group of employees is likely to be disadvantaged because of these designs
or changes.
210. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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thority or control respecting management or disposition of [plan] assets,"
(3) "renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation... with
respect to... such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so,"
or (4) "has any discretionary authority or ... responsibility in the admin-
istration of [the] plan." '211 ERISA requires employee benefit plans to
name one or more fiduciaries, who "have authority to control and man-
age the operation and administration of the plan.
'z12
A fiduciary has the responsibility to "discharge his [or her] duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants ... for the
exclusive purpose of... providing benefits to participants. '21 3 A fiduci-
ary must administer a plan consistently in accordance with the terms of
the plan documents. 14 The standard of care for a fiduciary is one of a
prudent person, acting in like circumstances.215
Breach of a fiduciary duty allows a participant to seek enforcement
of benefit rights.2 16 A breach of fiduciary duty also makes the fiduciary
personally liable for any losses incurred by the plan.21 7 A court may
order other equitable or remedial relief as it deems appropriate.218
Whether an employer violates a fiduciary duty by limiting AIDS
medical coverage in a group health plan depends on two factors.219
First, the employer must be a fiduciary. 20 Second, the employer must
have failed to discharge its fiduciary duties under the appropriate stan-
dard of review. 21
An employer who administers a self-funded group health plan is a
211. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A) (1988).
212. Id. § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 1102.
213. Id. § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i).
214. Id. § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
215. Id. § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
216. Id. § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
217. Id. § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
218. Id.
219. The threshold question in determining whether an employer's action violates a fiduci-
ary duty is whether the "action fall[s] within the fiduciary functions delineated by ERISA."
Payonk v. HMW Indus., 883 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1989).
220. See id. A fiduciary, or any other person who knowingly participates in a fiduciary
violation, is subject to a twenty percent penalty of the amount recovered by the Department of
Labor in a settlement or suit. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
239, § 2101, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (103 Stat.) 2106, 2123 (to be codified at
29 U.S.C. § 11320)). Thus, an employer who is not a fiduciary may still be subject to civil
penalties. Non-fiduciaries who may be subject to civil penalties generally include accountants,
actuaries, attorneys, consultants, or persons who perform only "ministerial" plan functions.
See Koss, Discharging Fiduciary Responsibilities: New Rules Mean New Vigilance, 3 BENEFITS
L.J. 213, 216-17 (1990).
221. Payonk, 883 F.2d at 225; see supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
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fiduciary under ERISA.222 The employer, not an insurance carrier, has
total control and authority of the disposition of plan assets.223 The em-
ployer usually has discretionary authority or responsibility to administer
the plan, especially since the employer controls the funds of the plan and
must direct the activities of the claims payor.224
The more difficult question is whether an employer violates its fidu-
ciary duty to a plan participant when it limits AIDS coverage in a group
health plan. If the denial or limitation occurs because of a plan amend-
ment, as in McGann,225 the employer has probably not breached a fiduci-
ary duty in the absence of any other ERISA violation.226 If, however, an
employer denies a benefit to which the participant is entitled under the
terms of the plan, as amended, the employer may breach the fiduciary
duty to act "solely in the interest of the participants... for the exclusive
purpose of... providing benefits to participants, ' 227 or the duty to ad-
minister the plan consistently in accordance with its terms.228 Neverthe-
less, an employer does not act in a fiduciary capacity when deciding to
amend or terminate an employee welfare benefit plan.229 An employer,
however, can breach a fiduciary duty if it fails to communicate material
information to a plan participant that could affect the participant's rights
222. See Payonk, 883 F.2d at 225 (when plan administrator "decides matters required in
plan administration or involving obligations imposed upon the administrator by the plan" ER-
ISA fiduciary duties attach). An employer, however, is not a fiduciary when the employer
merely makes business decisions not regulated by ERISA. Id.
223. See Harker, supra note 10, at 707-08 (under self-funding, insurer provides only admin-
istrative services and does not assume responsibility for claims liabilities).
224. See Payonk, 883 F.2d at 225 (employers are fiduciaries when they act as plan adminis-
trators); Genter v. Acme Scale & Supply Co., 776 F.2d 1180, 1184-85 (3d Cir. 1985) (employer
administrator of life insurance plan a fiduciary); Austin v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 498 F.
Supp. 844, 846 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (whether insurer a fiduciary depends on plan and agreement
with employer); see also Harker, supra note 10, at 709 (employers may be concerned over the
administrative responsibilities involved in self-funding).
225. 742 F. Supp. at 393; see supra notes 5, 56 and accompanying text.
226. Young, 849 F.2d at 1045 (employer does not breach fiduciary duty when it amends
employee welfare benefit plan); Witmeyer v. Kilroy, 788 F.2d 1021, 1024-25 (4th Cir. 1986)
(trustees did not breach fiduciary duty when retirement plan amendments met general ERISA
requirements); Sutton, 724 F.2d at 410-11 (employer did not violate fiduciary duty when it
amended plan not subject to ERISA vesting requirements).
227. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988).
228. Id. § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D). A participant whose benefit claim has
been denied must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to have a full and fair review of the
denial by the named plan fiduciary. Id. § 503(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).
229. Adams v. Avondale Indus., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 517
(1990). The court in Adams found that the employer had not acted in a fiduciary capacity
when amending its severance pay plan, an employee welfare benefits plan, in spite of the fact
that the employer had failed to reserve a right to amend the plan and had failed to comply with
ERISA reporting and disclosure requirements. Id. at 949-50.
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under the plan.23°
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the various provisions of ER-
ISA designed to protect the security of employee welfare plan benefits do
not provide adequate protection to an employee who has AIDS coverage
restricted by a group health plan. Federal discrimination statutes,
designed specifically to protect handicapped and disabled persons from
discrimination, are equally ineffective.
B. Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes
Two important pieces of federal legislation, designed to protect dis-
abled or handicapped employees from employment discrimination, may
apply to an employee suffering from inadequate AIDS coverage: the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 (the Rehabilitation Act)2 3 1 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990.232 Nevertheless, while these statutes
broadly protect handicapped persons from employment discrimination,
they provide little assistance to an employee to fight an employer who
restricts AIDS in an employee group health plan.
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
a. applying the statutory language to AIDS
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against individuals
with handicaps in federally funded programs.233 Sections 503 and 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act prohibit handicap discrimination relating to em-
ployee welfare benefit plans.234
Section 503 and its implementing regulations require federal con-
tractors with government contracts exceeding $2,500 annually to take
affirmative action to employ and advance "qualified individuals with
handicaps."23 The federal contractor must include an affirmative action
clause in each contract, under which the contractor agrees to "treat qual-
ified handicapped individuals without discrimination based upon their
physical or mental handicap in all employment practices such as... rates
230. Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (failure to inform
AIDS patient of conversion rights upon termination of group policy breached ERISA fiduci-
ary duty). Compliance with ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements does not neces-
sarily discharge a fiduciary duty to convey material information affecting rights of participants.
Id.
231. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988).
232. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 327 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
233. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794.
234. Id.
235. Id. § 793(a); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(a) (1990).
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of pay or other forms of compensation."236 Employee welfare benefit
plans constitute "other forms of compensation. '237
Section 504 is broader than section 503, and requires that an "other-
wise qualified individual with handicaps... shall [not], solely by reason
of her or his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance. 2 3  An individual is handi-
capped if the person: (1) "has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities," (2) "has a
record of such an impairment," or (3) "is regarded as having such an
impairment. 2 39  "Major life activities" are defined by regulations
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services.2"
AIDS is not specifically defined by the Rehabilitation Act as a hand-
icap;241 however, some courts and commentators have asserted that
AIDS should be considered a handicap under the Act.24 2 In School
Board v. Arline,243 the United States Supreme Court held that a person
with a contagious disease and a "physical impairment" is handicapped
within the meaning of section 504.244 The Court, however, specifically
reserved the question of whether HIV infection in the absence of physical
impairment was sufficient for a person to be handicapped under section
504.245 Some federal courts have relied on Arline to find that AIDS
236. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.4 (1990) (emphasis added).
237. See id.
238. 29 U.S.C. § 794; see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(a) (1990).
239. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B); see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.30) (1990).
240. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3()(2)(ii) (major life activities include "caring for one's self, per-
forming manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working").
241. The Rehabilitation Act regulations, promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services, do not identify specific handicaps. However, they define "physical impair-
ment" as "any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special
sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3G)(2)(i).
242. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 704-09 (9th Cir. 1988); Doe v.
Dolton Elementary School Dist., 694 F. Supp. 440, 443-45 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Thomas v. Atas-
cadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Note, Asymptomatic
Infection with the AIDS Virus as a Handicap Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 563 (1988) (arguing that asymptomatic HIV carriers are protected by the Rehabilita-
tion Act). For the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that an employee with HIV infec-
tion qualifies as an "individual with handicaps" under the Rehabilitation Act.
243. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
244. Id. at 285-86.
245. Id. at 282 n.7. The Court clarified that in the case before it the individual suffered
from both physical impairment and contagiousness, and that it would not decide "whether a
carrier of a contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a physical impair-
ment, or whether such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of contagiousness, a
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should be a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act.2' Subsequent fed-
eral legislation codified the holding in Arline that an otherwise qualified
person with a contagious disease is protected under section 504.247 The
United States Department of Justice has interpreted this legislation to
include HIV infection as a protected handicap.248
b. section 504 permits nondiscriminatory coverage limitations
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits employers from discriminating re-
garding fringe benefits against "otherwise qualified" handicapped per-
sons on the basis of their handicaps, whether or not the employer
administers the benefits.24 9 Generally, "'[ain otherwise qualified person
is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his
[or her] handicap.' "'25o In the employment relationship, an "otherwise
qualified" handicapped person is one who "with reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the job in question." '251
Therefore, in order to establish a claim of benefits discrimination under
the Rehabilitation Act, an employee must not only establish that the plan
has in fact discriminated on the basis of handicap, but that the person is
"otherwise qualified" to receive the benefits.
Outright denial of the opportunity to participate in an employee
benefit plan on the basis of a person's handicap, that the person would
otherwise qualify for, violates section 504.252 A plan requirement that
denies benefit plan eligibility only to employees with AIDS is an example
handicapped person as defined by the Act." Id. The Court, however, did reaffirm the congres-
sional intent of the "handicapped individual" definition to preclude discrimination against in-
dividuals who are "regarded as having an impairment," but who do not exhibit a physical or
mental incapacity. Id. at 282-86.
246. See, eg., Chalk, 840 F.2d at 701; Doe, 694 F. Supp. at 444; Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at
383.
247. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32
(1988) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)).
248. Justice Department Memorandum on Application of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act to HIV-Infected Persons, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at D-1 (Oct. 7,
1988). HIV infection is also now covered under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act.
OFCCP Directive on AIDS reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53, at A-9 (Mar. 21,
1989).
249. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(b)(6) (1990).
250. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 406 (1979)). An "otherwise qualified employee is a person who can perform 'the
essential functions' of the job in question." Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985)). The
"otherwise qualified" determination is made based on reasonable medical judgments, normally
by a public health official, about the nature, duration and severity of the risk, and the
probability the disease will be transmitted. Id. at 288.
251. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1990).
252. Id. § 84.4(b)(1)(i).
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of such a provision. An employee benefit plan also discriminates on the
basis of handicap if it does not afford an "otherwise qualified" handi-
capped person the same opportunity to obtain the benefit as someone
who is not handicapped. 253 For example, a plan that imposes a three-
month eligibility waiting period only for employees with AIDS probably
violates section 504.
c. common group health plan provisions do not violate section 504
Rather than containing provisions that limit only handicapped per-
sons' access to coverage, group health plans more commonly contain
provisions that have the effect of limiting coverage for all participants,
whether or not they are handicapped. 5 4 These provisions are nondis-
criminatory and permissible under the Rehabilitation Act, because they
do not limit coverage for handicapped persons, as defined, any more than
they limit coverage to persons who are not handicapped. 25 5 For exam-
ple, a pre-existing conditions limitation,2"6 which limits coverage for all
medical conditions existing at or before the time the employee becomes
eligible for the plan, does not violate section 504.257 An evidence of in-
surability provision,25 which applies equally to all employees, is also
permissible.259
To make out a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a handicapped
employee must show that he or she is qualified to receive the benefit in
spite of the handicap. 26° The employee must also show that the plan
253. Doe v. Devine, 545 F. Supp. 576, 585 (D.D.C. 1982) (section 504 "disallows a federal
[employer] from withholding from a handicapped individual a benefit that is made available to
others"), aff'd on other grounds, 703 F.2d 1319 (1983); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2) (1990).
254. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
255. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301-02 (1985) (neutral benefit reduction that does
not distinguish on basis of handicap does not violate section 504, which requires that an other-
wise qualified handicapped individual be provided meaningful access to benefit employer of-
fers); Doe, 545 F. Supp. at 585; 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1), (2).
256. See supra note 46 and accompanying text for a discussion of common group health
plan cost containment measures, including pre-existing conditions limitations.
257. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 302; 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1), (2).
258. An evidence of insurability provision applies to a prospective plan participant who
seeks coverage outside of the usual enrollment periods. Thomas, Group Underwriting and Re.
insurance, in LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK 433, 436-37 (3d ed. 1973). Before
the insurance company or plan administrator will extend coverage, the applicant must show
evidence of good health (insurability), usually by obtaining a physical examination at the appli-
cant's cost. Id. Failure to prove good health results in coverage being denied. See id.
259. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 302; 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1), (2).
260. Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768, 773 (8th Cir. 1987) (em-
ployee who could not perform essential job functions was not "otherwise qualified," and thus,
not entitled to section 504 protection for denial of employee benefits), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
938 (1988).
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provision discriminates against him or her. Providing a lesser benefit for
treatment of a mental or nervous disorder than is provided for other con-
ditions is acceptable, however, because a mentally ill person is not enti-
tled to a full benefit in spite of his or her handicap.261 Such a limitation
also does not discriminate against handicapped persons, because it ap-
plies equally to all employees whether or not they are defined as handi-
capped under section 504.262 Similarly, a provision in an employee
benefit plan that limits the dollar amount of coverage for AIDS treat-
ment probably does not violate section 504.
If a handicapped employee is not "otherwise qualified" to receive a
full benefit, the employer must make "reasonable accommodations" to
enable the employee to meet the program's requirements.263 An em-
ployer is excused from making an accommodation if it would impose an
undue hardship.2" An accommodation is unreasonable if it would im-
pose "'undue financial and administrative burdens'" on the employer,
or would require "'fundamental alteration[s] in the.., program.' "261
An employer with a self-funded group health plan that limits coverage
for AIDS could argue that providing full AIDS coverage would impose
an undue financial burden. Providing full coverage could also fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the program because it would require changing
the provisions of the plan.266 Therefore, even if the Rehabilitation Act
261. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 304 (Rehabilitation Act does not guarantee handicapped per-
sons equal results under state insurance program); Bernard B. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 528
F. Supp. 125, 132-33 (1981) (reduction of mental health benefits in state insurance plan did not
violate section 504-plan did not discriminate solely because of handicap and Congress did not
intend to protect entitlement to full medical benefits), aff'd, 679 F.2d 7 (1982).
262. Bernard B., 528 F. Supp. at 132-33. If this were not so, most group health insurance
plans of employers subject to the Rehabilitation Act would violate the Act, because group
health plans commonly provide less coverage for treatment of mental and nervous disorders,
or alcohol and drug dependency, than for other illnesses or conditions. Lipton, supra note 58,
at 173. See supra note 58 and accompanying text for a discussion of illnesses and conditions
commonly limited under group health insurance plans.
263. 29 U.S.C. § 794; 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k)(1), 84.12 (1990).
264. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1990). Factors to be considered in determining whether an ac-
commodation would impose an undue hardship include: (1) "[t]he overall size of the ...
program with respect to the number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size of
budget;" (2) "the type of ... operation, including the composition and structure of the...
workforce;" and (3) "the nature and cost of the accommodation needed." Id. § 84.12(c).
265. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 406 (1979)).
266. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 303 (section 504 does not require employers to design and offer
insurance benefits just to meet greater medical needs of handicapped individuals). As de-
scribed above, however, the provision is probably not discriminatory in the first place. See
supra notes 255-62 and accompanying text.
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applies to an employer, it does not offer much protection to an employee
who finds AIDS coverage restricted by a group health plan.
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)267 was passed
primarily as a national mandate aimed at eliminating discrimination
against the some forty-three million Americans who have one or more
physical or mental disabilities. 268 The ADA was designed to "provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. ' 269 The ADA was intended to pro-
tect persons with AIDS, as the legislative history discusses HIV infection
as a disability covered by the ADA, whether asymptomatic or AIDS.27 0
Title I of the ADA271 prohibits employment discrimination272 on
the basis of disability against a "qualified individual with a disability...
in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or dis-
charge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
267. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 327 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
268. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 2(a)(1), (b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(1),
(b)(1) (West Supp. 1990).
269. Id. § 2(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(2).
270. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION & LABOR, AMERICANS wiTH DISABILITIES ACT OF
1990, H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 303, 334 [hereinafter HOUSE EDUCATION & LABOR REP.]; 136 CONO. REC.
H2442 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Weiss); see Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, § 3(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).
271. Title I becomes effective on July 26, 1992. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 108, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 327, 337.
Many of the title I provisions were adopted from section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and its
implementing regulations. HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT OF 1990, H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-35, reprinted in 1990 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 445, 454-58 [hereinafter HOUSE JUDICIARY REP.]. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has proposed regulations implementing title I
of the ADA. 56 Fed. Reg. 8578-8603 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630) (proposed
Feb. 28, 1991).
272. Section 102(b) of the ADA describes definitions of "discrimination." The following
would include discrimination in employee benefit plans:
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a[n] ... employee in a way that ad-
versely affects the opportunities or status of such... employee because of the disabil-
ity of such.., employee;
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has
the effect of subjecting [an employer's] qualified... employee with a disability to the
discrimination prohibited [and] includes.. . providing fringe benefits to an employee
of the [employer]; [and]
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration... that have the
effect of discrimination on the basis of disability.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 102(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b) (West Supp. 1990);
see 56 Fed. Reg. 8589 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
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terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."273 Fringe benefits,
such as employee welfare benefit plans, are included within the scope of
"other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."'274
A "qualified individual with a disability" is an "individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the [job]." 27 An employer must make reason-
able accommodations for a qualified disabled individual unless such ac-
commodations would create an undue hardship on the employer.276
Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA specifically addresses the
issue of employer-sponsored insurance programs.277 Section 501(c) of
the ADA states that an employer or insurer is not prohibited from "es-
tablishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona
fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifyring risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
law.., or that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance. 2 7 8
An employer, however, cannot take any of these actions to evade the
273. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 102(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a).
274. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, AMERICANS WITH DISABILI-
TIES ACT OF 1990, S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (CCH) 713 (1990) [hereinafter SENATE REP.]; see 56 Fed. Reg.
8589 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
275. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 101(8), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West
Supp. 1990); see 56 Fed. Reg. 8588 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)-(n)) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991).
276. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A); see 56 Fed. Reg. 8589 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991). An "undue hardship" is an action which requires significant difficulty or
expense, considered in light of various factors. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
§ 101(10)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10)(A); see 56 Fed. Reg. 8588 (1991) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991). The definition and factors are based on and to
be interpreted consistently with the implementing regulations of sections 501 and 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. SENATE REP., supra note 274, at 36, reprinted in AMERICANS WITH DIS-
ABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (CCH) 712.
277. The ADA is not to be construed to apply a lesser standard than standards under the
Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations, except where otherwise noted. Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 501(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(a) (West Supp. 1990). The
Rehabilitation Act does not contain an express provision dealing with its effect on insurance
plans. Congress added section 501(c), id. § 501(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c), to the ADA to
clarify that it will not disrupt current insurance practices, whether insured or self-insured.
HOUSE EDUCATION & LABOR REP., supra note 270, at 136, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 303, 419.
278. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 501(c)(2)-(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c)(2)-
(3) (West Supp. 1990); see 56 Fed. Reg. 8591 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(f))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991). Section 501(c) reads:
(c) Insurance.-Titles I through IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or
restrict-
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organi-
zation, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations
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purposes of the ADA.2 7 9
Section 501 makes clear that the ADA does not disrupt current state
laws that regulate insurance, or employer practices that are consistent
with insurance risk classification.280 Additionally, the ADA does not af-
fect the administration of self-funded employee benefit plans, nor does it
affect ERISA preemption.281  The ADA does not, therefore, appear to
protect an employee from AIDS coverage restrictions under a self-
from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based
on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this Act from establishing, sponsoring,
observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this Act from establishing, sponsoring,
observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to
State laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1),(2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
title I and III.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 501(c)(l)-(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c)(1)-(3).
279. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 501(c)(1)-(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c)(l)-
(3).
280. HOUSE EDUCATION & LABOR REP., supra note 270, at 136-38, reprinted in 1990 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 303, 419-21. The report states:
[T]his legislation will not disrupt the current nature of insurance underwriting or the
current regulatory structure for self-insured employers or of the insurance industry
in sales, underwriting, pricing, administrative and other services, claims, and similar
insurance related activities based on classification of risks as regulated by the States.
In sum, section 501(c) is intended to afford to insurers and employers the same
opportunities they would enjoy in the absence of this legislation to design and admin-
ister insurance products and benefit plans in a manner that is consistent with basic
principles of insurance risk classification. This legislation assures that decisions con-
cerning the insurance of persons with disabilities which are not based on bona fide
risk classification be made in conformity with non-discrimination requirements.
Without such a clarification, this legislation could arguably find violative of its provi-
sions any action taken by an insurer or employer which treats disabled persons differ-
ently under an insurance or benefit plan because they represent an increased hazard
of death or illness.
Id.
The report further states:
The Committee does not intend that any provisions of this legislation should affect
the way the insurance industry does business in accordance with the State laws and
regulations under which it is regulated.
Virtually all States prohibit unfair discrimination among persons of the same
class and equal expectation of life. The ADA adopts tis [sic] prohibition of discrimi-
nation. Under the ADA, a person with a disability cannot be denied insurance or be
subject to different terms or conditions of insurance based on disability alone, if the
disability does not pose increased risks.
Id. at 136, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 303, 419.
281. 135 CONG. REc. S10,776 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin). Senator
Harkin stated:
There was some concern raised on the part of those who administer self-insurance
plans that the language of [ADA] sectin [sic] 501(c)92) [sic] could be read to affect
the preemption doctrine of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
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funded group health plan by adding protections not available under
ERISA.
The ADA, similar to the Rehabilitation Act, prohibits an employer
from providing unequal access to group health plan coverage based on
disability.282 A disabled person cannot be denied the opportunity to par-
ticipate in an employee benefit plan on the basis of disability.283 Also, a
qualified job applicant cannot be denied a job merely because the em-
ployee benefit plan does not cover AIDS treatment, or because the em-
ployer anticipates increased expenditures for such treatment.284
The ADA also prohibits an employer from denying coverage to a
disabled person independent of "underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks." '285 For example, an employee benefit plan can-
Congress does not intend in this bill to affect in any way such preemption doctrine
Id.
The House Committee on Education and Labor report states: "[S]elf-insured plans,
which are currently governed by the preemption provisions of the Employment [sic] Retire-
ment Income Security [Act] (ERISA), are still governed by that preemption provision and...
are subject to state law only to the extent determined by the courts in their interpretation of
ERISA's preemption provision." HousE EDUCATION & LABOR REP., supra note 270, at 137,
reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 303, 420.
282. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 102(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1990) (defining discrimination as limiting, segregating or classifying employee because of
disability in way that adversely affects opportunities); see 56 Fed. Reg. 8597 (1991) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. A) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991); see supra notes 254-62 and
accompanying text for a discussion of similar Rehabilitation Act provisions.
283. HOUSE JUDICIARY REP., supra note 271, at 71, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 445, 494.
284. See SENATE REP., supra note 274, at 84-86, reprinted in AMERICANS WITH DISABILI-
TIES ACT OF 1990 (CCH) 1102; HOUSE EDUCATION & LABOR REP., supra note 270, at 136,
reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 303, 419.
285. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 501(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c) (West
Supp. 1990). In the context of a group medical plan, risk refers to the probability that an
employee will become ill or have an accident, and incur medical expenses that will be reim-
bursed by the plan.
The EEOC has requested comments about insurance and risk to help develop a compli-
ance manual for the ADA:
1. What are the current risk assessment or classification practices with respect to
health and life insurance coverage in the area of employment?
2. Must risk assessment or classification be based on actuarial statistics?
3. What is the relationship between "risk" and "cost?"
4. Must an employer or insurance company consider the effect on individuals with
disabilities before making cost saving changes in its insurance coverage?
56 Fed. Reg. 8579 (1991).
If the EEOC agrees that the last of these questions must be answered in the affirmative in
order to comply with the ADA, it could provide additional protection to AIDS victims who
are denied group health coverage because of cost saving measures by an employer. See supra
note 56 for a discussion of a case in which the employer's proffered rationale for limiting AIDS
coverage in a group health plan was to reduce costs.
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not limit coverage for AIDS in the absence of an actuarial or underwrit-
ing risk classification.28 6 If the coverage restriction is based on sound
actuarial principles, or related to actual or anticipated costs, the em-
ployer probably can limit AIDS coverage.28 7 Under this standard, it
would not be difficult for an employer to use actual or expected cost
increases to justify an AIDS coverage restriction in a group health
plan.288 Other examples of group health plan provisions that usually
have a disproportionate impact on disabled individuals, yet are permissi-
ble under the ADA include: pre-existing conditions limitations, evidence
of insurability provisions, and lower coverage for mental or nervous
disorders.289
Even if an employer denies coverage to a disabled person consistent
286. HousE JUDICIARY REP., supra note 271, at 71, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 445, 494; SENATE REP., supra note 274, at 84-86, reprinted in AMERICANS
wrrH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (CCH) 11102. It is not entirely clear from the legislative
history and the proposed regulations whether the ADA, in addition to prohibiting an em-
ployee from being denied all coverage under a plan because of disability, also prohibits the
employee, once covered under the plan, from being denied all coverage for that disability. A
plan clearly may limit coverage for certain procedures or treatments, such as AZT for an
AIDS patient, if the limitation is based on risk classification and applied equally to individuals
with or without disabilities. HOUSE JUDICIARY REP., supra note 271, at 71, reprinted in 1990
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 445, 494; 56 Fed. Reg. 8597-98 (1991) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. A) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991). The House Judiciary report states, how-
ever, that while a plan can limit procedures or treatments, "coverage cannot be denied entirely
to a perosn [sic] with a disability." HousE JUDICIARY REP., supra note 271, at 71, reprinted in
1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 445, 494. One interpretation of this language is
that, once covered under the plan, a disabled person cannot be entirely denied coverage for
that disability. The better interpretation is that the ADA prohibits an employer from denying
all coverage under a plan based on a particular disability, but once the employee is covered
under the plan, the plan may entirely deny coverage for that disability if based on actuarial or
risk classification. In other words, the ADA guarantees equal access to a group health plan
provided by an employer, regardless of disability. This interpretation is supported by the ex-
ample of a blind person, who may not be denied coverage for blindness independent of actua-
rial classification. Ird. Conversely, coverage for blindness may be denied under a plan if
related to actuarial classification. A reduction of group health plan coverage that merely has a
greater impact on disabled persons does not violate the ADA, unless the reduction is adopted
for discriminatory reasons. 56 Fed. Reg. 8598 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app.
A) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
287. HOUSE JUDICIARY REP., supra note 271, at 71, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 445, 494; SENATE REP., supra note 274, at 84-86, reprinted in AMERICANS
wrrH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (CCH) 1102.
288. See HOUSE JUDICIARY REP., supra note 271, at 71, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 445, 494 (coverage limitations because of physical or mental impair-
ment permissible where related to actual or reasonably anticipated claims experience).
289. Id.; SENATE REP., supra note 274, at 84-86, reprinted in AMERICANS WITH DISABILI-
TIES ACT OF 1990 (CCH) % 1102. Pre-existing conditions limitations are specifically noted by
the proposed regulations as permissible, so long as they are not a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the regulations. 56 Fed. Reg. 8597 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app.
A) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
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with "basic principles of insurance risk classification, ' '2 ° the employer
violates the ADA if its actions are a subterfuge to avoid the purposes of
the ADA.2 91 Exactly what constitutes a subterfuge to avoid the purposes
of the ADA is not defined, although the legislative history of the ADA
does shed some light on this question.292
The subterfuge language in the ADA is very similar to the subter-
fuge language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA).293  In Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 294 the
Supreme Court noted that the term "subterfuge," interpreted in light of
the ADEA, should be given its ordinary meaning as "'a scheme, plan,
stratagem, or artifice of evasion.' "295 The Court ruled that an employee
benefit plan could not be a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the
ADEA "unless it discriminates in a manner forbidden by the substantive
provisions of the [ADEA]. 296 Based on this interpretation of subter-
fuge, a court would be likely to hold that an AIDS coverage limitation in
an employee benefit plan does not evade the purposes of the ADA unless
the provision violates the substantive provisions of the ADA. In other
words, if there is no risk classification violation based on sound actuarial
principles, or actual or reasonably anticipated costs, the AIDS limitation
does not constitute a subterfuge to avoid the purposes of the ADA.297
A subterfuge does occur, however, if an employer denies employ-
ment or eligibility in a benefit plan based on a person's disability, or be-
290. HousE EDUCATION & LABOR REP., supra note 270, at 138, reprinted in 1990 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 303, 421; SENATE REP., supra note 274, at 84-86, reprinted in
AMERICANS wITH DISABILmES ACT OF 1990 (CCH) 1102.
291. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 501(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c) (West
Supp. 1990); see 56 Fed. Reg. 8603 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. A) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991).
292. See infra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
293. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). The ADEA states that an employer may "observe the
terms of... any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter." Id. § 623(f)(2).
294. 109 S. Ct. 2854 (1989).
295. Id. at 2861 (quoting United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977)).
296. Id. at 2865-66. The Court further held that section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(f)(2), exempted employee benefit plans from the purview of ADEA as long as the plans
were not a subterfuge for discrimination in other non-benefit aspects of employment. Id. at
2866. Based on this interpretation of subterfuge, the Court held that Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission regulations construing section 4(f)(2) were invalid. Id. at 2865. These
regulations were restored by Congress in 1990. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 101-433, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 978 (to be codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-630). The Court's interpretation, however, of the term "subterfuge" still has
merit in construing the ADA.
297. See HOUSE JUDICIARY REP., supra note 271, at 71, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 445, 494.
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cause the employer anticipates increased insurance costs. 298 As noted
above, however, once an employee is covered by the plan, an employer
can provide coverage that discriminates against disabilities if based on
sound actuarial principles or experience. If employers violated the ADA
merely by providing different levels of coverage for different disabling
conditions, the overall effect on group health insurance plans would be
significant.
299
On the other hand, limiting AIDS coverage in a group health plan
can have devastating consequences for a person with AIDS. An em-
ployee with AIDS could argue that such limitations are a subterfuge,
even though based on actuarial or underwriting risk classification, if the
plan continues to provide full coverage for other illnesses that pose a
greater risk to the financial stability of the plan.3" The ADA does not,
however, go far enough in providing adequate protection against these
actions.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Current Federal Legislation Generally Is Ineffective
Current federal legislation generally is ineffective to protect an em-
ployee who loses health coverage for AIDS in an employee benefit plan.
The ERISA preemption doctrine is stronger than ever,3°0 and state
laws prohibiting AIDS discrimination in employee benefit plans have lit-
tle chance of avoiding federal preemption.30 2 In addition, an AIDS cov-
erage limitation probably does not violate ERISA vesting, reporting and
disclosure, interference with protected rights, and fiduciary duty
provisions.303
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 only prohibits discrimination in fed-
erally funded programs or by federal contractors.3 04 Even if an employer
fell within the Act's coverage, employee benefit plan provisions that limit
298. Id.
299. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
300. A plaintiff could analogize this situation to cases interpreting title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988); see, e.g., Arizona Governing
Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083-86 (1983) (employee pension plan, paying women lower
benefits than men for like contributions, violated title VII, in spite of actuarial basis for benefits
differentials); City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (employee pension
plan, requiring higher contributions from women than men to receive like benefits, violated
title VII, in spite of actuarial basis for contribution differentials).
301. See supra notes 86-158 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 168-230 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
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coverage for particular disabilities do not violate the Rehabilitation
Act.3
0 5
Relief for employees with AIDS facing group health coverage re-
strictions, especially in self-funded employee benefit plans, could come in
the form of court-made law, regulations or legislative activity. The ADA
is likely to provide a federal source of legal arguments to fight AIDS
restrictions in employee welfare benefit plans. Litigation challenging
AIDS restrictions as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA is
likely to occur.30 6 It is not clear, however, whether and how the ADA
will protect persons with AIDS in this situation. 307 Furthermore, final
regulations implementing title I of the ADA,30 8 governing employment
discrimination, will be issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (the EEOC).30 9 The final regulations could clarify how the
ADA will be implemented with respect to AIDS restrictions in employee
benefit plans, and specifically whether these coverage restrictions consti-
tute a subterfuge.
The simplest solution to this problem would be for employers to
voluntarily cover AIDS as any other illness under their employee benefit
plans.3 10 Given the rapidly escalating cost of health care benefits,3 1' and
employers' concerns over the AIDS epidemic, 312 however, it is likely that
employers will continue to use self-funding, and the resulting ERISA
preemption, to restrict group health coverage for AIDS. Therefore, un-
less employers can voluntarily restrain themselves from discriminating
on the basis of HIV infection in their employee benefit plans, federal leg-
islation should address this problem.
305. See supra notes 249-66 and accompanying text.
306. Such conduct could not be challenged until July 26, 1992, the effective date of the
prohibitions on employment discrimination under the ADA. See supra note 271 and accom-
panying text.
307. See supra notes 290-99 and accompanying text.
308. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, §§ 101-108, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111-12117
(West Supp. 1990).
309. Id. § 106, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12116. Proposed regulations implementing title I of the
ADA were recently issued by the EEOC. 56 Fed. Reg. 8578-8603 (1991) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1630) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991). The final regulations are not likely to provide
greater protections to AIDS victims than the ADA because the ADA leaves little room for
regulatory discretion. Id. at 8579.
310. In fact, over 400 employers have endorsed the principles of an AIDS "bill of rights,"
which calls for the nondiscriminatory treatment of persons with AIDS in employment. Brad-
ford, supra note 5, at 2. Employers who fail to heed these guidelines by imposing AIDS cover-
age restrictions in their group health plans may subject themselves to intense public and
employee scrutiny. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
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B. Considerations for Change
Congress should enact federal legislation aimed at AIDS restrictions
in employee welfare benefit plans. Such legislation should balance many
competing interests: (1) AIDS patients' interest in obtaining funding for
their health care; (2) employees' and the public's interests in prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of handicap; (3) employees' and
the public's interests in encouraging employers to provide group health
insurance benefits; and, (4) employers' interest in avoiding multiple state
mandates and conflicting laws, which would increase costs, complicate
administration, and discourage them from providing group health
benefits.
AIDS victims have a strong interest in obtaining health insurance
coverage, and the primary vehicle for such coverage is employee benefit
plans. The public has a strong interest in eliminating discrimination
against disabled individuals, eloquently expressed as a national mandate
by the ADA.313 The public also has a strong desire to increase the avail-
ability of health insurance coverage.3 14
Ultimately, the issue of whether employers should be able to restrict
AIDS coverage in health benefit plans rests on the question of who
should pay for AIDS treatment. The public has a strong interest in guar-
anteeing that AIDS victims are able to access privately funded health
insurance coverage, because if such coverage is not available, these per-
sons may need to rely on public sources of funding for their health
care.
315
313. See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
314. The United States Department of Labor has estimated that 30 million Americans do
not have health insurance coverage. Mandated Benefits Would Increase Costs While Reducing
Number of Uninsured Persons, 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1812, 1812 (Oct. 22, 1990). Mandating
employers to provide health insurance coverage to their employees could reduce this number
to 8.7 million. Id.
A number of bills have been introduced in Congress which would require employers, in
some form, to provide health insurance coverage to their employees. See H.R. 5300, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (sponsored by Rep. Stark); H.R. 1845, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
(sponsored by Rep. Waxman); S. 768, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (sponsored by Sen. Ken-
nedy). One of the broadest proposals for reform came from the Pepper Commission, and
would require employers to provide either health insurance to their employees or contribute to
a public plan for all employees. U.S. BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH
CARE, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PEPPER COMMISSION: AccESS TO
HEALTH CARE AND LONG-TERM CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS (1990); see Pepper Commission
Releases Report, Declines to Recommend Financing Source, 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1666 (Oct. 1,
1990). While Congress is interested in expanding access to health insurance coverage, there is
currently a lack of consensus as to the appropriate mechanism for doing so. Upcoming Re-
forms Incremental Due to Lack of Consensus, Aides Say, 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 2041 (Dec. 10,
1990).
315. See ACLU, supra note 5, at 26 ("government is becoming the primary insurer of a
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Employers have a number of interests that should be considered.
First, employers should continue to have the flexibility to design and
amend employee welfare benefit plans to allow for their financial secur-
ity. Employers need financial resources to provide health care plans. As
a result, as health care costs continue to rise at a rapid rate, employers
can only expend more resources, reduce benefits, or ask employees to
share in the cost of providing the benefits.316 The proposal should be
consistent with the ERISA purpose of protecting the financial solvency
of employee welfare benefit plans. 17
Employers operating in more than one state should have the ability
to maintain uniform employee benefit plans, without having to comply
with overlapping and conflicting state mandates.31 Subjecting employ-
ers to multiple state mandates would complicate employee benefit plan
administration and funnel employer expenses into administration rather
than funding benefits. It would also discourage employers from provid-
ing employee benefit programs. The public has a strong interest in en-
couraging employers to provide health care benefits, 19 therefore,
Congress should not weaken the current ERISA preemption doctrine.
Given the strong public interest in eliminating discrimination based
upon disability, employers should not be permitted to discriminate on the
basis of one illness, namely AIDS, while continuing to provide full cover-
age for other catastrophic or chronic illnesses. Any solution to this prob-
lem, though, whether legislative or court-made, must weigh the
protections afforded to employers under ERISA to design and modify
their employee benefit plans with the individual protections from dis-
crimination set forth in the ADA.
C. Proposal To Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The ADA provides a mechanism to prohibit AIDS discrimination
in employee welfare benefit plans. The ADA currently allows AIDS dis-
crimination in employee benefit plans so long as the coverage restriction
growing number of people with HIV-related illness" (citing J. Green & P. Arno, The "Medi-
caidization" of AIDS: Implications of the AIDS Payor Mix for Access and Quality (Nov. 3,
1989) (paper presented to the National Commission on AIDS))).
316. Even if an employer does not directly increase the cost of benefits to employees
through benefit reductions, for example, coverage exclusions, coverage limitations, higher de-
ductibles or higher coinsurance levels, higher employer costs may indirectly affect employees
in the form of reduced salaries or other benefits. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
318. The Supreme Court has made it clear that avoiding overlapping and conflicting state
mandates is a fundamental purpose of the ERISA preemption doctrine. See supra notes 143-
44 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
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is consistent with an actuarial or underwriting risk classification.320 A
restriction would meet this test if it was related to actual or anticipated
costs.321 Therefore, an employer's argument that AIDS would increase
health care expenses would probably satisfy this test, and the coverage
restriction would be nondiscriminatory.322
Even if an employer's cost argument is effective, that employer vio-
lates the ADA if the coverage restriction is a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the ADA.323 The meaning of "subterfuge" and how it ap-
plies to different factual situations is best left to the courts, and undoubt-
edly there will be litigation in this area. Courts should address whether
AIDS coverage limitations in group health plans, that continue to pro-
vide full coverage for other catastrophic or chronic disabilities, are a sub-
terfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA. An AIDS victim could argue
that such limitations are a subterfuge, even though based on actuarial or
underwriting risk classification, because of the employer's continuation
of unreduced coverage for other illnesses that pose a greater risk to the
financial stability of the plan.324 By defining a situation in which an em-
ployer engages in a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA, how-
ever, discriminatory coverage restrictions in employee benefit plans could
be prohibited.
Congress should amend section 501(c) of the ADA325 by clarifying
that an employer evades the purposes of the ADA as a subterfuge when
it: (1) restricts coverage in an employee welfare benefit plan based on an
actuarial or underwriting risk classification, including actual or antici-
pated experience, (2) by limiting or excluding coverage for a catastrophic
or chronic disability (as defined), (3) to the extent that such coverage is
less than that provided for other catastrophic or chronic disabilities cov-
ered by the plan.326 In other words, an employer should not be permit-
ted to reduce AIDS coverage while continuing to cover other
catastrophic or chronic disabilities at normal levels. This proposal has a
number of advantages over current laws. First, it protects employees
with AIDS and other catastrophic illnesses from arbitrary discrimination
that targets a particular illness for limitation or exclusion. Second, it
320. See supra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
325. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 501(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c) (West
Supp. 1990).
326. See supra note 60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the estimated costs of
medical care for catastrophic and chronic illnesses other than AIDS.
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serves the purposes of the ADA without disturbing ERISA preemption.
Third, an employer would still be able to design its health insurance
plans to meet its needs and the needs of employees, including traditional
limitations on mental or nervous disorders. Fourth, the proposal is con-
sistent with recent congressional attempts to improve access to health
insurance through private employer mandates.
The proposal does have some drawbacks. First, it gives employers
less flexibility in designing group health insurance plans and responding
to higher health care costs. Second, the proposal could have a discrimi-
natory effect, in that non1catastrophic disabilities may still be subject to
separate limitations or exclusions. Finally, employers could impose cov-
erage limitations on AIDS so long as they also reduce coverage for other
catastrophic illnesses. An employer may have little incentive to reduce
coverage for all catastrophic illnesses, however, because the employer
would likely subject itself to severe employee dissatisfaction. In sum-
mary, the proposal prohibits AIDS discrimination in employee welfare
benefit plans, while balancing the interests of employees with AIDS, em-
ployers, and the public.
VI. CONCLUSION
AIDS victims may have difficulty maintaining adequate group
health insurance coverage because some employers limit AIDS coverage
to hold down benefits costs. Additionally, current federal law does not
adequately protect an employee with AIDS who has group health cover-
age limited or denied by an employer.
Employers are avoiding state laws which purport to prohibit AIDS
discrimination in employment or employee benefits by self-funding their
group health benefits. Self-funded employee benefit plans are exempt
from state regulation that relates to such plans, through ERISA preemp-
tion. Self-funding allows employers to discriminate against employees
with AIDS by excluding or limiting coverage for AIDS, while continuing
to cover other catastrophic illnesses.
An employer who limits AIDS coverage in a group health plan does
not violate the substantive provisions of ERISA by taking such action.
ERISA's vesting rules do not entitle a plan participant to a nonforfeitable
right to certain levels of AIDS coverage. The reporting and disclosure
rules do not provide a source of relief, as long as the employer has met
the various requirements prior to and at the time of the plan restriction.
The most likely source of an ERISA remedy is the provision which pro-
hibits employer interference with protected rights. Employee welfare
benefit plans are not, however, protected from change under ERISA.
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Absent an independent agreement, a plaintiff would have difficulty estab-
lishing that he or she is entitled to a certain level of benefits under a
group health plan. Finally, an employer does not violate a fiduciary duty
under ERISA by amending a welfare plan and reducing coverage.
The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, both of which prohibit em-
ployment discrimination against handicapped persons, do not provide ef-
fective sources of relief for an AIDS victim denied group health plan
coverage. A person with AIDS is generally not "otherwise qualified" to
receive unchanged levels of benefits under the Rehabilitation Act. Under
the ADA, a plan with reduced AIDS coverage could probably be justi-
fied because of actual or anticipated claims costs, and would probably not
be a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA.
Employers have a strong and legitimate interest in holding down
health insurance costs, especially when the rapidly rising costs of medical
care are preventing many Americans from receiving adequate health
care. Employers fund a majority of health care in the United States, and
are viewed by Congress as a vehicle through which health care access can
be expanded in the future. Therefore, legislative solutions to the AIDS
coverage problem should not discourage employers from maintaining
group health plans, or subject them to multiple state mandates by weak-
ening the ERISA preemption doctrine.
The ADA provides a mechanism through which AIDS discrimina-
tion in employee welfare benefit plans can be limited. Essentially, the
proposal would restrict the ability of an employer to limit coverage for
AIDS while continuing to provide unreduced coverage for other cata-
strophic or chronic disabilities. The proposal is consistent with the
ERISA purpose of protecting the financial solvency of employee welfare
benefit plans. If an employer attempts to justify an AIDS restriction on
the basis of cost, but still continues to provide full coverage for other
catastrophic or chronic disabilities, its actions would be deemed a subter-
fuge to evade the purposes of the ADA. Ultimately, any legislative re-
sponse to AIDS discrimination restrictions in employee benefit plans
must wrestle with the larger issue of who should fund AIDS treatment,
and balance the interests of persons with AIDS with those of employers
and society as a whole.
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